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INTRODUCTION 
Should Congress exempt smaller reporting companies from Section 
404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”)?1  Section 404,2 which 
is arguably the most controversial of SOX’s provisions,3 requires report-
ing companies (i.e., companies that are subject to the public reporting 
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,4 the “Exchange 
Act”) to take greater responsibility for their internal control over finan-
cial reporting (“ICFR”).5  Specifically, Section 404 requires that (i) a 
 1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered Sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.) [hereinafter SOX]. 
 2. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2002). 
 3. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT 
(Nov. 30, 2006) 115 [hereinafter CCMR REPORT] (“The main policy debate over SOX   
. . . is focused on the implementation of a single provision, Section 404 . . . .”). 
 4. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78mm (2006)) [hereinafter Exchange Act]. 
 5. Section 404 does not use the phrase “internal control over financial reporting,” 
but instead refers to a company’s “internal control structure and procedures for financial 
reporting.”  SOX §§ Section 404(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a), (b) (2002).  To provide 
greater clarity to the concept, the SEC adopted and defined the term “internal control 
over financial reporting” in its rules implementing Section 404.  Final Rule: 
Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and Certification 
of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports,  Release Nos. 33-8238; 34-47986; IC-
26068 (June 5, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8238.htm  
[hereinafter SEC Release 33-8238].  The SEC amended rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f) of 
the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-15(f) and § 240.15d-15(f), to define “internal 
control over financial reporting” as: 
[a] process designed by, or under the supervision of, the registrant’s principal 
executive and financial officers, or persons performing similar functions, and effected 
by the registrant’s board of directors, management and other personnel, to provide 
reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the 
preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles and includes those policies and procedures that: 
(1) Pertain to the maintenance of records that in reasonable detail accurately and 
fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the registrant; 
(2) Provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to 
permit preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the registrant are being 
made only in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of the 
registrant; and 
(3) Provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of 
unauthorized acquisition, use or disposition of the registrant’s assets that could 
have a material effect on the financial statements. 
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-15(f), 240.15d-15(f) (2007). 
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reporting company’s management annually assess and publicly disclose 
the effectiveness of the company’s ICFR6, and (ii) the company’s out-
side auditor attest to that assessment.7 
The primary objective for Section 404 is presumably to improve the 
accuracy of financial disclosure by requiring companies to maintain 
effective ICFRs.8  The controversy surrounding Section 404, however, 
has not focused on the provision’s underlying objective,9 but rather on 
whether the substantial compliance costs involved with Section 404 ex-
ceed the statute’s benefits.10  In its June 2003 release adopting the imple-
mentation rules for Section 404,11 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the “SEC”) estimated that the annual cost for Section 404 
compliance would run $91,000 per company.12  Subsequent studies have 
shown, however, that the actual cost is exponentially greater than the 
 6. SOX § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. 7262(a) (2002). 
 7. Id. § 7262(b). 
 8. CCMR REPORT, supra note 3, at 119. 
 9. Id. at 115. Note, however, that the CCMR Report states a slightly different 
objective for Section 404 than is proposed by this Article, as the CCMR Report focuses 
more on a possible public perception goal.  The CCMR Report states that Section 404 
“is aimed at reducing the market impact from accounting ‘errors’ – whether from fraud, 
inadvertent misstatements, or omissions – by assuring investors that public companies 
maintain effective controls over financial reporting.”  Id. 
 10. See, e.g., HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY 
DEBACLE – WHAT WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 38-42, 53-55, 82-85 (2006); 
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO SARBANES-OXLEY 4-7, 247-50 
(2007) [hereinafter BAINBRIDGE GUIDE TO SOX]; Ehud Kamar et al., Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
Effects on Small Firms: What is the Evidence? 2 (USC CLEO Research Paper No. C07-
9, 2007),  available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=993198; Robert A. Prentice, Sarbanes-
Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703, 725-
57 (2007); William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public after Sarbanes-Oxley: The 
Irony of “Going Private”, 55 EMORY L.J. 141, 141-43 (2006); CCMR Report, supra 
note 3, at 115. 
 11. SEC Release 33-8238, supra note 5. 
 12. Id. The SEC described its methodology for its estimate as follows: 
This estimate is based on the estimated total burden hours of 5,396,266 [divided by 
14,000 companies, results in roughly 385 hours per company], an assumed 75%/25% 
split of the burden hours between internal staff and external professionals, and an 
hourly rate of $200 for internal staff time and $300 for external professionals. The 
hourly cost estimate is based on consultations with several registrants and law firms 
and other persons who regularly assist registrants in preparing and filing periodic 
reports with the Commission. Our PRA estimate does not reflect any additional cost 
burdens that a company will incur as a result of having to obtain an auditor’s 
attestation on management’s internal control report. 
Id. at n.174. 
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SEC’s initial estimate.13  Far from a slight additional regulatory cost, 
reporting companies could be spending more to comply with Section 
404 than on any other SOX provision.14  The fact that a regulation gen-
erates substantial compliance costs, however, is not by itself problem-
atic.  Rather, a problem arises when a regulation generates substantial 
compliance costs without generating benefits that equal or exceed those 
costs.  Specifically, if Section 404 imposed substantial compliance costs 
accompanied by benefits to companies and their shareholders that 
exceeded those costs, then Section 404 would be “cost-effective” and 
should be considered a beneficial regulation.  If Section 404 generated 
benefits that are less than its substantial compliance costs, however, then 
Section 404 would be “cost-ineffective.” 
Currently, there is no consensus on the cost-effectiveness of Section 
404.15  Critics of the statute decry that Section 404 “has gone too far”16 
and point to: (1) the substantial compliance costs, reasoning that it is 
unrealistic to expect that Section 404 generates sufficient benefits to off-
set those costs; and (2) anecdotal evidence that suggests smaller report-
ing companies are employing strategies to avoid being subject to Section 
404.17  Conversely, proponents for Section 404 tend to focus on the 
beneficial impact that Section 404 should have on investor protection 
and on an issuer’s cost of capital by improving financial disclosure 
accuracy.18 
If Section 404 turns out to be cost-ineffective, the companies that 
are most threatened are smaller companies, as cost-ineffective regula-
tions tend to disproportionately harm smaller companies.19  At the same 
time, certain classes of smaller companies have proven to be particularly 
 13. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 14. Cynthia A. Glassman, SEC Comm’r, Internal Controls Over Financial 
Reporting – Putting Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 in Perspective, Speech Before the 12th 
Annual CFO Summit (May 8, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/ 
2006/spch050806cag.htm. 
 15. CCMR REPORT, supra note 3, at 115. 
 16. See, e.g., John Stossel, Sarbanes-Oxley has Gone Too Far, JFS PRODUCTIONS, 
INC., Dec. 21, 2005, available at http://www.realclearpolitics.com/Commentary/com-12 
_21_05_JS.html. 
 17. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
 18. See, e.g., Charles D. Niemeier, Bd. Member, Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight 
Bd., American Competitiveness in International Capital Markets (Sept. 30, 2006), 
available at http://www.pcaobus.org/News_and_Events/Events/2006/Speech/09-30_ 
Niemeier.aspx. 
 19. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
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valuable to the U.S. economy by creating a disproportionate amount of 
the innovations, macroeconomic growth, and net new jobs in the United 
States.20  These two premises, taken together, argue for federal policy-
makers to be extremely cautious before imposing potentially cost-inef-
fective regulations like Section 404 on smaller companies.  At the same 
time, however, smaller reporting companies – and the investors who 
tend to invest in them – may also have the greatest need for the services 
provided by Section 404,21 which would argue against granting smaller 
reporting companies relief from Section 404. 
In the face of this uncertainty, what should federal policymakers 
do?  To date, the SEC has not ignored Section 404’s potential negative 
impact on smaller companies.  It has chosen to implement Section 404 
slowly to allow for a learning curve to develop on how best to imple-
ment the Section 404 process before requiring smaller reporting 
companies to comply.22 The SEC has also tried to make management’s 
and auditors’ evaluations of ICFRs more effective and efficient – and 
thereby less expensive – by amending the rules relating to manage-
ment’s evaluation of ICFR, issuing interpretative guidance that manage-
ment can use as a safe harbor in its evaluation of ICFRs, and adopting 
new auditing standards.23  In February 2008, the SEC announced an 
additional delay of Section 404’s auditor attestation requirement for the 
smallest reporting companies (i.e., non-accelerated filers, which gener-
ally speaking are those with worldwide public equity floats of less than 
$75 million)24, so that the SEC can study the cost-benefit impact of that 
auditor attestation requirement for smaller companies.25  The auditor 
attestation requirement will therefore not become mandatory for these 
smallest reporting companies until they file their annual reports for the 
fiscal year ending on or after December 15, 2009.26 
 20. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 21. Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 9-11, 27. 
 22. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 23. Id. 
 24. The term “non-accelerated filer” is not defined in the Exchange Act.  Instead, 
the term “non-accelerated filer” captures issuers that are not “large accelerated filers” or 
“accelerated filers” as defined in rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 
(2008). 
 25. SEC Begins Small Business Costs and Benefit Study of Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
Section 404, Release No. 2008-8 (Feb. 1, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
press/2008/2008-8.htm. 
 26. SEC Approves One-Year Extension for Small Businesses From Auditor 
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This Article considers whether Congress and the SEC should go 
further and exempt smaller reporting companies altogether from Section 
404 compliance.  Such exemption could come in a number of different 
forms – from complete exemption from Section 404, to allowing smaller 
reporting companies the ability to opt out of Section 404, to granting 
smaller reporting companies relief from the auditor attestation portion of 
Section 404.27  These exemption requests do have some appeal, as they 
suggest a market-based resolution to the uncertain value of Section 404 
for smaller reporting companies.  In each case, smaller reporting com-
panies would be relieved (either substantially or completely) from man-
datory compliance with Section 404, but would retain the ability to 
voluntarily choose to more fully comply with Section 404 if they found 
it to be cost-effective.  Rather than debate the cost-effectiveness of 
Section 404, these Section 404 relief proposals appear to provide a 
definitive mechanism for answering the cost-benefit question simply by 
allowing investors to express their demand (or lack of demand) for the 
services provided by Section 404 through the price they pay for 
securities. 
While empowering smaller reporting companies with such market-
based regulatory solutions might seem appealing at first glance, this 
Article explains why structural factors within the public securities 
markets for smaller reporting companies will prevent such market-based 
proposals from accurately determining the net effect of Section 404.  
Instead, exempting smaller reporting companies from Section 404 is 
likely to significantly increase the information asymmetry between 
smaller reporting companies and their investors.  This outcome would be 
particularly problematic since unsophisticated, ordinary investors (rather 
than institutional investors) are the predominant external shareholders 
for smaller reporting companies and ordinary shareholders have histor-
ically demonstrated themselves to be vulnerable to just this type of 
information asymmetry.28  This Article constructs a model for analyzing 
the probable impact of granting Section 404 relief to smaller reporting 
companies and concludes that making Section 404 voluntary for smaller 
reporting companies would almost certainly guarantee an insufficient 
Attestation Requirement in Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Release No. 2008-16 (June 20, 2008), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-116.htm [hereinafter SEC 
Release 2008-16]. 
 27. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
 28. See infra Part V.C.2. 
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amount of investment by those companies in their ICFR, with the cost 
for that insufficient dedication of resources to ICFR being borne pri-
marily and unknowingly by unsophisticated, ordinary investors. 
This Article recommends, therefore, that smaller reporting compa-
nies be subject to the same Section 404 requirements as large companies 
and that Congress resist calls to grant substantial Section 404 relief to 
smaller reporting companies.  Further, this Article advocates that smaller 
reporting companies be required to become fully Section 404 compliant 
as soon as practicable. 
In furtherance of these propositions, this Article proceeds as 
follows: Part I provides an overview of Section 404 and its intended 
benefits.  Part II then considers the special attributes of smaller compa-
nies that might warrant their receiving particular attention from policy-
makers.  Part III examines the evidence regarding Section 404’s substan-
tial compliance costs.  Part IV sifts through evidence on the benefits that 
derive from Section 404 and examines the Section’s probable net effect, 
including an examination of certain post-SOX trends that could indicate 
that Section 404 is cost-ineffective, such as: (1) an increase in “going-
dark” transactions, (2) a decrease in U.S. IPOs by smaller companies, 
and (3) an increase in IPOs on foreign stock markets by smaller U.S. 
companies.  Part IV also explains why, in spite of the anecdotal evi-
dence, Section 404’s net effect on smaller reporting companies remains 
unclear.  Part V examines the market-based proposals to exempt smaller 
reporting companies from Section 404 and provides a model for ana-
lyzing the probable impact of granting Section 404 relief to smaller 
reporting companies. Finally, Part VI offers a conclusion as well as 
some cautionary qualifications. 
PART I: SECTION 404 AND ITS INTENDED BENEFITS 
A. Basic Statutory Requirement 
For the all the controversy it has stirred, Section 404 is a relatively 
straightforward statute.  It consists of two provisions. The first, Section 
404(a),29 requires that each annual report filed by a reporting company 
contain an “internal control report”30 that: 
 
 
 29. SOX § 404(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (2002). 
 30. Id. 
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(1) “state[s] the responsibility of management for establishing and 
maintaining an adequate internal control structure and proce-
dures for financial reporting;”31 and 
(2) “contain[s] an assessment, as of the end of the most recent 
fiscal year of the issuer, of the effectiveness of the internal 
control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial 
reporting.”32 
 
In short, management must identify, understand and assess the 
company’s internal systems for gathering and evaluating the information 
needed to generate accurate financial reports,33 and disclose any 
“material weaknesses”34 in the company’s ICFR.  Section 404 focuses 
specifically on ICFR, which is defined as: 
[A] process designed by, or under the supervision of, the issuer’s 
principal executive and financial officers, or persons performing 
similar functions, and effected by the issuer’s board of directors, 
management and other personnel, to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of 
financial statements for external purposes in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting principles.35 
The process must include policies and procedures for maintaining 
accurate accounting records, ensuring that receipts and expenditures are 
made only in accordance with management authorization, and safe-
guarding assets.36 
The second provision, Section 404(b),37 inserts an external monitor 
to help ensure the accuracy of the Section 404(a) internal control report.  
Specifically, Section 404(b) requires that the company’s registered pub-
lic accounting firm that audited the financial statements included in the 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See BAINBRIDGE GUIDE TO SOX, supra note 10, at 198. 
 34. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.308(a)(3). “Management is not permitted to 
conclude that the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting is effective if 
there are one or more material weaknesses in the registrant’s internal control over 
financial reporting.”  Id. 
 35. Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(f) & 15d-15(f), 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-15(f), 
240.15d-15(f). 
 36. Id. 
 37. SOX § 404(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(b) (2002). 
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annual report “attest to, and report on, the assessment made by the 
management of the issuer.”38 
B. Intended Benefits 
Overall, SOX involves a broad range of corporate governance 
reforms that were meant to improve investor protection and increase the 
efficiency of the U.S. public securities markets, primarily by increasing 
the disclosure requirements of reporting companies and establishing 
stronger standards for: (i) reporting company directors and senior 
management; (ii) public auditors; and (iii) investment banks.39  Why did 
Congress decide to include in this batch of reforms a requirement that 
reporting companies enhance their ICFR?  And more importantly, does 
an increased regulatory focus on internal controls significantly improve 
financial reporting?  The true answer to this latter question is that 
nobody really knows, as little research has been conducted on the 
efficacy of mandatory internal controls.40 
The fact that nobody really knows whether mandatory internal 
control requirements such as Section 404 are a valuable regulatory 
approach does not mean that they cannot be valuable.  It simply means 
that the case has yet to be proved.  Theoretically, requiring companies to 
improve their ICFR “should” improve the quality of financial reporting, 
which should in turn increase social welfare, so long as the cost of these 
enhanced requirements does not exceed their benefit.  Before addressing 
the cost-benefit issue, it is useful to understand the benefits that one 
should expect to flow from Section 404, if it works as intended. 
1.  More Accurate Financial Reporting 
The primary objective of Section 404 is (presumably) to improve 
the accuracy of the financial disclosure made by reporting companies. 
The Exchange Act imposes substantial reporting obligations on report-
 
 38. Id. 
 39. For a thorough discussion of the various requirements of SOX, see BAINBRIDGE 
GUIDE TO SOX, supra note 10. 
 40. JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 145 (2006).  “Some critics suspect that this new emphasis on internal 
controls has become a knee-jerk regulatory response that is empty of actual content, 
serving a function more symbolic than substantive.”  Id. 
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ing companies,41 including extensive disclosure of the company’s 
financial data.42 This financial reporting obligation is ultimately dis-
charged by the company’s senior management (e.g., its chief executive 
officer (“CEO”), its chief financial officer (“CFO”), and, to a lesser 
extent, its board of directors). Unfortunately, there is a significant risk 
that those managers will not provide accurate financial information 
when they discharge their duty. 
To begin with, the managers may decide to deliberately falsify the 
data (e.g., Enron or WorldCom). Corporate managers may fall prey to 
the classic “agency problems” that arise in corporations due to the 
separation of ownership from control43  and try to take advantage of cor-
porate governance deficiencies to fraudulently appropriate for their own 
private benefit a portion of the corporation’s wealth.44  For example, a 
CEO whose bonus is tied to the corporation’s reported profits may be 
motivated to fraudulently inflate its profits in order to receive a higher 
bonus.  Better internal controls could help to prevent such fraudulent 
practices by creating a clearer trail for identifying inappropriate mana-
gerial behavior.45 
 41. See, e.g., Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a), and Exchange Act § 
15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d) (2006). 
 42. See, e.g., Exchange Act Form 10-K, Item 8 (requiring reporting companies to 
publicly disclose extensive financial information about themselves). 
 43. Adam Smith described the problem as follows: 
The directors of [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of other 
people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch 
over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to 
consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily 
give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, 
must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a 
company. 
ADAM SMITH, Of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth, in AN INQUIRY INTO 
THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 264–65 (Univ. of Chi. Press 
1976) (1776); see also, ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN 
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
 44. See Stephen J. Choi & Jill E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher 
Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 113 YALE L.J. 269, 271 (2003); 
Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation, 28 
CARDOZO L. REV. 333, 339 (2006). 
 45. Congress first used this method of employing internal controls as a supplement 
to prohibited behavior with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”), Title I of Pub. 
Law No. 95-213 (1977).  COFFEE, supra note 40, at 144.  Inspired primarily by 
“concerns over foreign kickbacks and other corrupt practices taking place abroad,” 
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While deliberate falsification of data by companies occurs on 
occasion and receives a lot of attention, it is actually the exception and 
not the rule.46 The more systemic source of inaccurate data likely arises 
from managers’ inadvertent disclosure of incomplete and/or inaccurate 
financial data.  A company’s senior management does not inherently 
have complete and accurate financial information about the issuer, 
particularly as economic activities of companies grow ever more com-
plex.  In order for management to “output” accurate financial disclosure, 
it needs to have in place robust systems that gather and assess the 
information that feeds the eventual financial disclosure.  Better informa-
tion input systems (i.e., better internal controls) should lead to manage-
ment having more complete and accurate information about the issuer, 
which should in turn lead to better public disclosure.  One can think of 
this as an example of the “garbage in, garbage out” principle.47  In order 
to provide better financial disclosure output, management needs to have 
in place better information input systems.  Section 404 could help to 
encourage such better information input systems. 
2.  Improve Market Efficiency and Reduce Cost of Capital 
Better financial disclosure by reporting companies should lead to 
more efficient securities markets and a lower cost of capital for issuers. 
Information is often characterized as the “lifeblood” of securities 
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 22.2, at 803 (5th ed. 
2005), Congress, among other things, amended Section 13 of the Exchange Act to 
require reporting companies to “devise and maintain a system of internal accounting 
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that . . . transactions are recorded as 
necessary . . . to maintain accountability for assets.”  Exchange Act § 
13(b)(2)(B)(ii)(II), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(ii).  In effect, the FCPA required 
companies to “record” their previously off-book accounts (i.e., slush funds) that were 
used to pay bribes to foreign officials.  COFFEE, supra note 40, at 144. 
 46. Frank Fernandez, The Roles and Responsibilities of Securities Analysts, 7 RES. 
REP. 3, 6 (2001), available at http://www.sia.com/research/pdf/RsrchRprtVol2-7.PDF. 
 47. Garbage In, Garbage Out (abbreviated to GIGO) is a commonly used phrase in 
the computer science field.  Wikipedia, Garbage In, Garbage Out, http://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Garbage_in,_garbage_out (last visited Jan. 15, 2009).  “It is used primarily to 
call attention to the fact that computers, unlike humans, will unquestioningly process 
the most nonsensical of input data and produce nonsensical output.”  Id.  The term 
Garbage In, Garbage Out can also be used more liberally to describe any process where 
“it is difficult to create a good result when given bad input.”  Id.  This Article employs 
the second, more liberal usage of the term. 
338 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
markets.48  In an ideal securities market, fully-informed buyers and 
sellers negotiate at arm’s length (and at low transaction costs) to deter-
mine whether or not a particular transaction makes sense.  Accurate 
information about an investment facilitates proper allocation of invest-
ment capital among competing investment opportunities.  On the one 
hand, the seller of the investment is properly informed about the value of 
the company, as well as the optimal timing and structure of the finan-
cing, so as to achieve the lowest cost of capital.  On the other hand, the 
buyer of the investment is properly informed about the merits of that 
particular investment, as well as other available investment opportu-
nities, so that the buyer can allocate her capital to the investments that 
are likely to generate the highest returns. 
A reporting company’s financial disclosure is some of the most 
important information that impacts the price of its securities.  Take, for 
example, common stock, which represents a percentage ownership in a 
corporation.  Assuming a typical form of common stock, this ownership 
share entitles the stockholder to a number of rights (both economic and 
non-economic),49 the most significant of which is a residual claim on the 
corporation’s net assets.50  In plain English, that residual claim means: 
 
• The stockholders do not have direct ownership in the corporation’s 
assets, nor are they responsible for the corporation’s liabilities. The 
corporation owns its own assets and is responsible for its own 
liabilities. 
 48. John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A 
Proposal to Expand the Intermediary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising 
Setting, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 861, 879 (2005) [hereinafter Orcutt, Angel Finance Market]; 
see also Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC, Quality Information: The Lifeblood of Our 
Markets, Remarks at the Economic Club of New York (Oct. 18, 1999), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch304.htm. 
 49. Voting rights are typically the most important non-economic rights associated 
with common stock.  Those voting rights include the right to vote on directors, certain 
business combinations, amendments to the corporation’s charter documents (e.g., its 
certificate of incorporation), and dissolution of the corporation. 
 50. “[H]olders of common stock possess the residual claim on the corporation’s 
assets . . . each share of common stock has an equal right to participate in distributions 
of the firm’s earnings in the form of dividends and, in the event the corporation is 
liquidated, to share equally in the firm’s assets remaining after all prior claims have 
been satisfied.”  STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 66 
(2002). 
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• Instead, the stockholders have an ownership interest in what this 
Article will refer to as the corporation’s “residual.” The residual is 
the assets that remain upon the liquidation of the corporation after 
all of the corporation’s liabilities have been satisfied.51  In addition 
to waiting for the ultimate liquidation of the corporation, stock-
holders may also receive a portion of the residual on a current basis 
if the corporation is solvent52 and decides to use a portion of its net 
assets to pay a dividend or buy back outstanding stock. 
 
This economic right in the corporation’s residual drives the value of 
a stock.  Roughly speaking, the value of a stock should be based on the 
share of the corporation’s eventual residual (including future dividend 
payouts and stock buybacks) represented by the stock, discounted back 
to present value.53  Assuming a healthy growing corporation, the even-
tual residual should be substantially greater than its current net asset 
position, which means that much (if not most) of the corporation’s even-
tual residual will be generated in the future by the corporation genera-
ting future profits.  The value of the stock is therefore fundamentally 
driven by forecasts of the corporation’s future profits.54  Competently 
forecasting a corporation’s future profits and eventual residual is an in-
herently difficult task, as predicting the future will always entail a 
substantial amount of error.55  However, having the corporation provide 
credible information about its current financial position and historical 
financial track record is important for those seeking to develop intelli-
gent forecasts and value the corporation’s stock price. 
When corporations do not consistently provide credible financial 
information, at least two substantial negative consequences should be 
expected.  First, the market will be less efficient at pricing the corpora-
 51. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 281(a)-(b) (2008). 
 52. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 170(a)-(b) (2008). 
 53. The present value is the current worth of a future sum of money or stream of 
cash flows given a specified rate of return.  Investopedia, Present Value, http://www. 
investopedia.com/terms/p/presentvalue.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
 54. See BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 173 (2003). 
 55. See John L. Orcutt, Investor Skepticism v. Investor Confidence: Why the New 
Research Analyst Reforms Will Harm Investors, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 69 (2003) 
[hereinafter Orcutt, Investor Skepticism] (analyzing the difficulties that sell-side 
analysts have demonstrated in forecasting the future earnings of the companies they 
cover and considering explanations for their struggles other than the conflicts of interest 
that face such analysts). 
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tions’ securities due to the incomplete or inaccurate information, which 
will lead to inferior allocation of investment capital (e.g., too much in-
vestment capital may be dedicated to bad companies).  Second, investors 
should adjust to this less efficient environment by charging a higher 
price for their investment capital.  Rational, sophisticated investors will 
discount the price they are willing to pay for securities (i.e., charge a 
higher cost of capital) to compensate for the increased information risk 
they face. 
Therefore, if Section 404 does, in fact, improve the accuracy of 
reporting companies’ financial disclosure, the price of securities traded 
on the U.S. public markets should be more accurate and provide issuers 
a lower cost of capital. 
3. Unintended Benefits 
While not the direct focus of Section 404, some unintended benefits 
from the statute have been reported. The Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation56, an independent, nonpartisan organization composed of 
representatives from business, finance, law, accounting and academia, 
reported the following: 
In some cases, Section 404 control reviews appear to have acted as a 
catalyst for companies to improve the efficiency of financial 
management. This change has led either to direct cost savings – for 
example, through rationalization of the payments process – or to 
improved loss avoidance, through enhanced security and safeguards. 
Section 404 has also served as a catalyst for some companies to 
develop Enterprise Risk Management programs, which address all 
sources of risk, not just financial reporting. In the future, Section 404 
programs and the control environments they have fostered will be 
even more useful as companies embark on initiatives to provide 
investors with real-time and more customizable financial reporting 
information.57 
 56. See Committee on Capital Markets Regulation Homepage, http://www.capmkts 
reg.org/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).  “The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation is 
an independent and nonpartisan 501(c)(3) research organization dedicated to improving 
the regulation of U.S. capital markets.”  Id. 
 57. CCMR REPORT, supra note 3, at 119 (internal citations omitted). 
2009 THE CASE AGAINST EXEMPTING 341 
SMALLER REPORTING COMPANIES 
C. Section 404 Might not be Cost-Effective: Regulatory Response 
The controversy surrounding Section 404 has not focused on the 
provision’s goal for companies to have better ICFRs and more accurate 
financial disclosure. Instead, the controversy centers on whether the sub-
stantial costs required to implement Section 404 exceed the statute’s 
benefits, particularly for smaller reporting companies. 
Congress charged the SEC with developing the rules for imple-
menting Section 404(a) and designated the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”)58 to establish the Section 404(b) auditor 
assessment standard.  The initial implementing rules and procedures 
were not problem-free.  The SEC issued rules implementing Section 
404(a) in June 2003,59 and the PCAOB issued the corresponding auditor 
standards (“Auditing Standard No. 2” or “AS 2”) in March 2004.60  
Reporting companies and auditors struggled with these initial implemen-
tation rules and auditing standards, which led to the development of 
Section 404 policies and procedures that proved to be “burdensome and 
time-consuming in practice.”61 
The SEC and PCAOB have tried to respond to these imple-
mentation concerns.  First, the SEC implemented Section 404 slowly to 
allow for a learning curve to develop on how best to conduct the Section 
404 process.  As difficulties in implementation became apparent, the 
SEC postponed compliance deadlines on more than one occasion, in par-
ticular for smaller companies, in order to give issuers and auditors time 
to adapt to Section 404.  The following table sets forth the various 
deadlines and postponements: 
 
 58. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) Home Page, 
http://www.pcaobus.org/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).  The PCAOB is the independent 
board created by SOX to oversee the auditors of reporting companies.  SOX § 101(a) 
and (b), 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) and (b) (2002). 
 59. SEC Release 33-8238, supra note 5. 
 60. PCAOB, AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2 (Mar. 9, 2002), http://www.pcaobus. 
org/Rules/Rules_of_the_Board/Auditing_Standard_2.pdf.  The SEC approved Auditing 
Standard No. 2 on June 17, 2004.  Order Approving Proposed Auditing Standard No. 2, 
Release No. 34-49884 (June 17, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/34-
49884.htm. 
 61. WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP, SEC DEFINES “MATERIAL WEAKNESS” AND 
GIVES GUIDANCE ON EVALUATION OF INTERNAL CONTROLS, Aug. 28, 2007, at 2,  
http://www.willkie.com/files/tbl_s29Publications%5CFileUpload5686%5C2486%5CS
EC_Defines_Material_Weakness_and_Gives_Guidance.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2009) 
[hereinafter WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER PUBLICATION]. 
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Status of Issuer Section 404 Compliance Deadline 
Large accelerated 
filers
Initially required to include management report on ICFR 
and auditor attestation in their annual reports for fiscal 
years ending on or after June 15, 2004.
62
 
63  The SEC granted 
an extension in Feb. 2004 that delayed the initial 




Initially subject to the same deadlines as large accelerated 
filers.65 66  For accelerated filers with fiscal years ending 
between and including Nov. 15, 2004 and Feb. 28, 2005, 
the SEC granted them up to an additional 45 days to 
include management report on ICFR and auditor attestation 







Initially required to include management report on ICFR 
and auditor attestation in their annual reports for fiscal 
years ending on or after April 15, 2005.70  The SEC 
granted several extensions (the last of which was in Feb. 
2008) that delayed the initial compliance deadlines as 
follows: 
68 69):   
• Not required to include a management report on ICFR 
until it files an annual report for the fiscal year ending on 
or after Dec. 15, 2007.71 
• Not required to include an auditor attestation until it files 
an annual report for the fiscal year ending on or after 
Dec. 15, 2009.72  
 
 62. Public company with a worldwide public equity float (excluding affiliates) 
of $700 million or more and has filed at least one annual report with the SEC. 
Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, supra note 24. 
 63. SEC Release 33-8238, supra note 5. 
 64. Final Rule: Management’s Reports on Internal Control Over Financial 
Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Release 
Nos. 33-8392; 34-49313; IC-26357 (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
rules/final/33-8392.htm [hereinafter SEC Release 33-8392]; 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 228-29, 
240, 249, 270, 274 (2008). 
 65. Public company with a worldwide public equity float (excluding affiliates) 
of $75 million or more, but less than $700 million, and has filed at least one annual 
report with the SEC.  Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, supra note 24. 
 66. At the time of the original SEC releases implementing Section 404 (e.g., SEC 
Releases 33-8238 and 33-8392), the term “large accelerated filers” did not exist.  At 
that time, the category was simply “accelerated filers” and included both “large 
accelerated filers” and “accelerated filers.”  The SEC did not split the accelerated filer 
definition into two separate categories until December 21, 2005.  Final Rule: Revisions 
to Accelerated Filer Definition and Accelerated Deadlines for Filing Periodic Reports, 
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In June 2007, the SEC amended the rules relating to management’s 
evaluation of ICFR73 and issued interpretative guidance for manage-
ment’s use in its evaluation.74  These changes were meant to make man-
Release Nos. 33-8644, 34-52989 (Dec. 21, 2005), 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 229, 240, 249, 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8644.pdf  [hereinafter SEC Release 33-
8644]. 
 67. Order under Section 36 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Granting an 
Exemption from Specified Provisions of Exchange Act Rules 13a-1 and 15d-1, Release 
No. 34-50754 (Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/exorders/34-
50754.htm. 
 68. Exchange Act Rule 3b-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4 (2008), defines the term 
“foreign private issuer” as: 
[A]ny foreign issuer other than a foreign government except for an issuer meeting the 
following conditions . . . : 
• More than 50 percent of the issuer’s outstanding voting securities are directly 
or indirectly held of record by residents of the United States; and 
• Any of the following: 
? The majority of the executive officers or directors are United States 
citizens or residents; 
? More than 50 percent of the assets of the issuer are located in the United 
States; or 
? The business of the issuer is administered principally in the United States. 
Like with non-accelerated filers, the SEC has deemed that foreign private issuers 
require special attention and has granted these issuers significant extensions for 
complying with Section 404. This Article does not address the special case of foreign 
private issuers and instead focuses entirely on the special case of smaller companies 
generally. 
 69. Public company with a worldwide public equity float (excluding affiliates) 
of less than $75 million, or one that has yet to file an annual report with the SEC.  
The term “non-accelerated filer” is not defined in the Exchange Act.  Instead, the term 
“non-accelerated filer” captures issuers that are not “large accelerated filers” or 
“accelerated filers” as defined in Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, supra note 24. 
 70. SEC Release 33-8238, supra note 5. 
 71. Final Rule: Internal Control Over Financial Reporting in Exchange Act 
Periodic Reports of Non-Accelerated Filers and Newly Public Companies, Release Nos. 
33-8760; 34-54942 (Dec. 15, 2006); 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 228, 229, 240, 249 (2008), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8760.pdf. 
 72. SEC Release 2008-16, supra note 26. 
 73. Final Rule: Amendments to Rules Regarding Management’s Report on Internal 
Control Over Financial Reporting, Release Nos. 33-8809; 34-55928 (June 20, 2007), 17 
C.F.R. §§ 210, 228, 229, 240, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2007/33-
8809.pdf. 
 74. Interpretive Release: Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Report 
on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Under Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release Nos. 33-8810; 34-55929 (June 20, 2007), 17 
C.F.R. § 241, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2007/33-8810.pdf [herein-
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agement’s evaluation of ICFR more effective and more efficient by 
endorsing a “top-down, risk-based evaluation” that focuses on prevent-
ing material misstatements in financial statements.75  In May 2007, the 
PCAOB adopted Auditing Standard No. 5 (“AS 5”)76 to replace the pre-
viously used AS 2,77 and the SEC later approved AS 5 in July 2007.78  
Among other things, these actions79 created a safe harbor for manage-
ment evaluations that comply with the SEC’s interpretative guidance80 
and brought management’s evaluation of ICFR more into alignment 
with the auditor’s responsibilities under AS 5.81  These changes were 
after SEC Interpretive Release 33-8810]. 
 75. Id. at 1, 4. 
 76. PCAOB, Auditing Standard No. 5 – An Audit of Internal Control Over 
Financial Reporting that is Integrated with an Audit of Financial Statements, available 
at http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Rules_of_the_Board/Auditing_Standard_5.pdf.  AS 5 
applies to audits for fiscal years ending on or after November 15, 2007.  PCAOB, 
Board Approves New Audit Standard for Internal Control over Financial Reporting 
and, Separately, Recommendations on Inspection Frequency Rule, May 24, 2007, 
available at http://www.pcaobus.org/News_and_Events/News/2007/05-24.aspx. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Order Approving Proposed Auditing Standard No. 5, An Audit of Internal 
Control Over Financial Reporting that is Integrated with an Audit of Financial 
Statements, a Related Independence Rule, and Conforming Amendments, Release No. 
34-56152 (July 27, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/pcaob/2007/34-561 
52.pdf [hereinafter SEC Release 34-56152]. 
 79. In a related rule release, the SEC adopted a definition for the term “significant 
deficiency” for purpose of the SEC rules implementing Section 404 and 302.  Final 
Rule: Definition of the Term Significant Deficiency, Release Nos. 33-8829 and 34-
56203 (Aug. 3, 2007), 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 240, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
final/2007/33-8829.pdf [hereinafter SEC Release 33-8829]. 
 80. SEC Interpretive Release 33-8810, supra note 74, at 1. 
 81. Press Release: SEC Approves New Guidance for Compliance with Section 404 
of Sarbanes-Oxley (May 23, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/ 
2007/2007-101.htm [hereinafter SEC May 2007 Press Release].  For practical 
summaries of the mid-June 2007 changes by the SEC and the PCAOB to Section 404 
compliance, see WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER PUBLICATION, supra note 61; PAUL, 
WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON & GARRISON LLP, SEC ADOPTS FINAL RULES AND 
PUBLISHES INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE FOR MANAGEMENT REGARDING ITS EVALUATION 
OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING, July 13, 2007, at 2, 
http://www.paulweiss.com/files/Publication/205da5f8-e527-48d7-8c89-269a30fab5ee/ 
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/30b4db2e-f850-4887-aeaa-2cc4d4921550/13-Jul-
07SECMemo.pdf; JONES DAY, SEC ADOPTS SECTION 404 INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE AND 
RULE AMENDMENTS; NEW PCAOB AUDITING STANDARD, July 2007, http://www. 
jonesday.com/pubs/pubs_detail.aspx?pubID=S4459. 
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meant to create a more flexible environment where management and the 
auditors can scale their Section 404 efforts according to the particular 
facts and circumstances of the company.82  For smaller, less complex 
reporting companies, the changes were meant to allow management and 
the auditors to tailor their efforts to reflect the company’s lower level of 
complexity.83 
In practice, even before the recent SEC and PCAOB changes – 
which should help to reduce compliance costs – Section 404 compliance 
costs appeared to be declining.84  Nevertheless, there remains a signifi-
cant risk that Section 404 compliance costs currently exceed the statute’s 
benefits and that Section 404 may continue to be a cost-ineffective 
statute. 
PART II: DO SMALLER COMPANIES REQUIRE SPECIAL ATTENTION? 
In the face of this potentially cost-ineffective statute, is there some-
thing about smaller companies that warrants their receiving significant 
relief from Section 404? The answer to this question turns out to be 
“maybe.”  Before analyzing the special case of smaller companies, it is 
necessary to point out that there is no precise definition for what consti-
tutes a “smaller company.” One of the most commonly employed tech-
niques for classifying companies by size is to consider their equity 
market capitalization.  This is the approach, for example, that the SEC 
has taken with respect to Section 404.  Roughly speaking, reporting 
companies with market capitalizations of $700 million or more are 
“larger” reporting companies,85 while those with market capitalizations 
of less than $75 million are the “smallest” reporting companies.86  For 
those reporting companies that fall in the middle range (i.e., market 
capitalization between $75 million and $700 million), many – if not all 
of them – could be considered “smaller” reporting companies, and are 
frequently referred to as “smallcap” companies.87  Since this Article 
 82. SEC May 2007 Press Release, supra note 81; see also SEC Release 34-56152, 
supra note 78, at 4. 
 83. SEC May 2007 Press Release, supra note 81; see also SEC Release 34-56152, 
supra note 78, at 4. 
 84. See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 85. Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, supra note 24 (defining “large accelerated filers”). 
 86. These companies would not qualify as “accelerated filers” as defined in 
Exchange Act Rule 12b-2, supra note 24. 
 87. See, e.g., Final Report of the Advisory Committee on Smaller Public 
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concludes that smaller reporting companies should not be granted 
special regulatory relief, it will not be exploring the precise boundaries 
of the classification. 
A. Cost-Ineffective Regulations Tend to Disproportionately  
Harm Smaller Companies 
As a general rule, complying with legal mandates is disproportion-
ately more expensive for smaller companies (e.g., as a percentage of 
revenues or profits) than for larger companies.88 This increased regu-
latory burden for smaller companies appears to stem from the tendency 
of regulatory compliance to involve a significant amount of fixed costs, 
irrespective of the size of a company.89  For example, a firm must 
develop an expertise in the particular regulation or requirement, and 
establish internal procedures, and assign personnel, to handle the 
regulatory or compliance function.  Many of these information-gathering 
and personnel costs are not dependent upon firm size. Thus smaller 
firms with lesser revenues are forced to bear these fixed costs over a 
smaller revenue base, which disproportionately lowers their profita-
bility.90  The same principle applies to auditing activities.  Smaller 
companies have also historically paid disproportionately higher audit 
fees (as a percentage of revenues) than larger companies.  Because 
Section 404 involves both an increased regulatory and auditing burden, 
 
Companies to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 15 and 16 (2006), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf. 
 88. EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUNDATION, ON THE ROAD TO AN 
ENTREPRENEURIAL ECONOMY: A RESEARCH AND POLICY GUIDE 28 (July 2007), 
available at http://www.kauffman.org/uploadedFiles/entrepreneurial_roadmap_2.pdf.  
But see W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS (Sept. 
2005), available at http://heartland.temp.siteexecutive.com/pdf/21117.pdf (report 
delivered under a contact with the Office of Advocacy, the United States Small 
Business Administration). Crain’s study indicates that the most extreme dispro-
portionate impact occurs with small companies that have less than 20 employees.  Id. at 
54-55.  Section 404, however, is unlikely to apply to such extremely small companies.  
When Crain compared companies with between 21 and 499 employees (“medium-sized 
companies”) to companies with 500 or more employees (“large companies”), the 
disproportionate impact of regulatory costs shrinks substantially.  Id. 
 89. See Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Bus. Admin., The 
Changing Burden of Regulation, Paperwork, and Tax Compliance on Small Business – 
A Report to Congress (Oct. 1995), available at http://www.sba.gov/ADVO/laws/ 
archive/law_brd.html [hereinafter OCCA Report]. 
 90. See id. 
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it poses a double threat of disproportionate treatment for smaller 
companies. 
A 2006 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (the 
“GAO”) to the U.S. Senate Committee on Small Business and Entrepre-
neurship (the “GAO Report”)91 provides evidence of the disproportion-
ately higher audit fees that smaller companies face and of Section 404’s 
aggravation of the situation.  The GAO Report, which analyzed the im-
pact of SOX on smaller public companies (including costs of compli-
ance and access to capital),92 found that “resource limitations make it 
more difficult for smaller public companies to achieve economies of 
scale, segregate duties and responsibilities, and hire qualified accounting 
personnel to prepare and report financial information.”93  The GAO 
Report examined public issuers’ audit fees in 2003 and 2004 (the first 
year that internal control reports were required) and found: 
 
• “[s]maller companies historically have paid disproportionately 
higher audit fees than larger companies as a percent of reve-
nues;”94 and 
• “the percentage difference between median audit fees paid by 
small versus large public companies grew in 2004, particularly 
for companies that implemented [SOX’s] internal control pro-
visions (section 404).”95 
 
The following table provides the summary statistics from the 
GAO’s examination of audit fee costs:96 
 
 91. U. S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON SMALL 
BUSINESS AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP, U.S. SENATE: SARBANES-OXLEY ACT – 
CONSIDERATION OF KEY PRINCIPLES NEEDED IN ADDRESSING IMPLEMENTATION FOR 
SMALLER PUBLIC COMPANIES (Apr. 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
d06361.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
 92. Id. at 2. 
 93. Id. at 18. 
 94. Id. at 5. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 16. Professors Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, and Talley produced a similar 
table in their article on SOX’s effect on small firms.  Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 14. 
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(% of 2003 
revenues)
Companies that 
filed ICFR reports 
in 2004 
Median audit fee 
(% of 2004 revenues)98














$0 - $75 0.64% 66 of 2,263 3% 1.14% 0.79% 
>$75 - $250 0.29% 520 of 1,188 44% 0.56% 0.35% 
>$250 - $500 0.18% 376 of 641 59% 0.40% 0.26% 
>$500 - $700 0.15% 184 of 309 60% 0.30% 0.20% 
>$700 - 
$1,000 
0.13% 183 of 283 65% 0.25% 0.12% 
>$1 00 0.07% 927 of 1,342 69% 0.13% 0.07% ,0
 
While cost-ineffective regulations harm all companies, smaller 
companies are particularly vulnerable.  Due to greater resource con-
straints, smaller companies already face numerous and substantial disad-
vantages when trying to compete against larger companies.100  If Section 
 
 97. Based on publicly-reported audit fees.  GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 15. 
 98. Based on publicly-reported audit fees.  Id. at 15. 
 99. While the GAO REPORT provides an approximation of the impact of Section 
404 on audit fees, the methodology of the GAO REPORT did not allow it to specifically 
isolate the audit fees associated with Section 404.  Id. at 15. 
 100. More than a half century ago, economist Joseph A. Schumpeter explained how 
the need for smaller companies to overcome their competitive disadvantages vis-à-vis 
larger, more well-established competitors helps to revolutionize economies from within.  
This process, which Schumpeter referred to as “Creative Destruction,” describes how 
new, smaller competitors must seek innovations to render their competitors obsolete.  
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 83 (3d ed. 1950). 
Entrepreneurs create new products, markets, processes for doing business, and even 
new industries, while old inefficient ones are destroyed. These newly created ventures 
must be more innovative and productive than their already established competitors in 
order to compete, which has the added benefit of forcing the established competitors to 
improve. Established competitors, as well as entire industries, that cannot meet the 
increased competition and innovations are forced out of business, which causes a 
constant renewal of the economy.  Id. 
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ron-
ment for forming and developing smaller companies less attractive. 
B. Small Companies are not a Homogenous Group
404 is in fact cost-ineffective, the greater resource constraints that tend 
to hamper smaller companies – coupled with the disproportionately ne-
gative impact of cost-ineffective regulations and auditing standards – 
make it even more difficult for them to compete by retarding their 
growth (i.e., making them less profitable) and further exacerbating their 
resource disadvantages vis-à-vis their larger, more well-established 
competitors.  Such an outcome should be expected to render the envi
 
ying the implementation of Section 404 for non-
accelerated filers:101 
more patents per employee than large patenting 
businesses.102 
Proposals calling for Section 404 relief for smaller reporting com-
panies are frequently motivated, at least in part, by this potential threat 
to smaller companies and the perceived critical role that smaller compa-
nies play in the U.S. economy.  For example, in his testimony before the 
House Small Business Committee on June 5, 2007 regarding the impact 
of Section 404 on small companies, David T. Hirschmann, Senior Vice 
President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce and President, U.S. Chamber 
Center for Capital Markets, made the following statement as a 
justification for dela
Small business drives much of the economic activity, innovation, 
and job creation in the United States. Over the last decade, for 
example, small businesses have generated 60 to 80 percent of net 
new jobs. These businesses made up 97 percent of exporters and 
produced 28 percent of the known export value in FY 2005. Small 
businesses employ 41 percent of high-tech workers and produce 13 
to 14 times 
 
 101. David T. Hirschmann, Senior Vice President, U.S. Chamber of Commerce and 
President, U.S. Chamber Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, Testimony 
before the House Small Business Committee, Getting Small Business Right: Sarbanes-
Oxley Section 404 and Small Business (June 5, 2007), available at http://www.house. 
 http://web.sba.gov/faqs/ 
faqIndexAll.cfm?areaid=24 (last visited Jan. 14, 2009)). 
gov/smbiz/hearings/hearing-06-5-07-sox/testimony-06-05-07-USCC.pdf. 
 102. Id. at 3 (citing U.S. Small Business Administration, Frequently Asked 
Questions – Advocacy Small Business Statistics and Research,
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Despite the frequency of such small businesses accolades,103 these 
general statements about the benefits of small businesses are misleading 
and can distort the analysis of policy initiatives aimed at assisting U.S. 
economic growth and job creation.104  General statements of this sort are 
misleading because it is simply and unambiguously inaccurate to view 
small companies as a homogenous group.105  In reality, the term small 
company encompasses a wide range of different types of companies, not 
all of which serve such economically and socially beneficial roles.  For 
example, the Small Business Association provides statistics for “small 
businesses”, which are generally defined as those business having less 
than 500 employees.106  SOX has almost no impact on the vast majority 
 103. See, e.g., U.S. Small Business Administration, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.sba.gov/advo/stats/sbfaq.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2009) (providing various 
statistics about smaller businesses).  Even the Chairman of the SEC is prone to such 
general statements about small businesses. In his opening remarks for the 2006 SEC 
Government-Business Forum on Small Business Capital Formation, SEC Chairman 
Christopher Cox made the following statement: 
Since the beginning of our country, small businesses have been the backbone of the 
American economy. It’s a continuing marvel that even today, in the 21st century – in 
the midst of globalization and globe straddling technology, small business creates 
more jobs than anyone else . . . .  Small businesses pump billions in the economy. 
They are, in many ways, what makes America great. 
25TH ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS CAPITAL 
FORMATION, FINAL REPORT, 10 (2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus 
/gbfor25.pdf. 
 104. Daniel Sandler, Tax Incentives and Angel Capital: Federal & State Incentive 
Review and Commentary, VC EXPERTS, Nov. 2, 2004, available at http://vcexperts.com 
/vce/news/buzz/archive_view.asp?id=245 (on file with author). 
 105. Robert Heilbroner and Lester Thurow discussed this misconception as follows: 
In the last two decades the assertion has often been made that most of the jobs in 
America are being created by small businesses and that, as a result, such business 
should be seen as the engines of national economic success.  By implication, nothing 
else is necessary or important.  Such assertions are neither factually correct nor 
economically true.  What creates jobs are not small businesses as such, but small 
businesses that grow large (Wal-Mart, Hewlett Packard, Microsoft). 
ROBERT HEILBRONER & LESTER THUROW, ECONOMICS EXPLAINED: EVERYTHING YOU 
NEED TO KNOW ABOUT HOW THE ECONOMY WORKS AND WHERE IT’S GOING 171 (rev. 
ed., Simon & Schuster 1998). 
 106. U.S. Small Business Administration, Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 
103. 
The Office of Advocacy [of the U.S. Small Business Administration] defines a small 
business for research purposes as an independent business having fewer than 500 
employees. Firms wishing to be designated small businesses for government programs 
such as contracting must meet size standards specified by the U.S. Small Business 
Administration (SBA) Office of Size Standards. These standards vary by industry [.] 
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of “small businesses,” as SOX only applies to reporting companies and 
the vast majority of small businesses are private companies with no 
desire (or no realistic hope) of ever being a reporting company.  More 
than 90% of small businesses consist of what are commonly referred to 
as “livelihood businesses”107 (also referred to as “Mom and Pop busi-
nesses”), whose object is: 
[T]o provide an income for the organizers and perhaps members of 
their families . . . . There is no “exit strategy,” no expectation of a 
dynamic multiple of earnings being paid for the business five years 
down the road, no equity investors other than the founder . . . no 
sources of cash capital other than the local bank.108 
For example, owner-operated convenience stores, suburban con-
struction companies, or hair salons typically fall under the livelihood 
business classification.  As a result, discussions of the potential impact 
of Section 404 on “small businesses” generally overstate the statute’s 
reach. In practice, the “small companies” that are impacted by Section 
404 constitute a very different profile of companies than the traditional 
small business designation.  The group impacted by Section 404 is 
limited to smaller reporting companies and to private companies for 
which becoming a reporting company is a reasonable possibility in the 
foreseeable future (e.g., companies that reasonably forecast conducting 
an IPO in the foreseeable future).  To provide some structure to this 
concept, and to highlight the heterogeneity of smaller companies and 
their particular issues, this Article will distinguish between three types 
of small companies that are impacted by Section 404: 
 
Rapid-Growth Start-ups: These private companies are created with 
the intention to rapidly grow and become dominant firms. Rapid-Growth 
Start-ups are well-represented in the high technology sector (e.g., the 
private technology firms that dominate Silicon Valley) and are frequent-
ly the target of venture capital investments.109 While representing only a 
very small percentage of private small businesses, it is Rapid-Growth 
Id. 
 107. DANIEL SANDLER, VENTURE CAPITAL AND TAX INCENTIVES: A COMPARATIVE 
STUDY OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 2 (2004) . 
 108. JOSEPH W. BARTLETT, EQUITY FINANCE: VENTURE CAPITAL, BUYOUTS, 
RESTRUCTURINGS AND REORGANIZATIONS 7 (2d ed. 1995). 
 109. Orcutt, Angel Finance Market, supra note 48, at 865. 
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Start-ups, and not livelihood businesses, that have demonstrated a capa-
city to create a disproportionate amount of the innovations,110 macroeco-
nomic growth,111 and net new jobs112 in the United States.113 
 
Growth Smaller Reporting Companies (“Growth SRCs”): These 
smaller reporting companies have a realistic possibility of growing and 
becoming large companies. This category is dominated by (i) former 
rapid-growth start-ups that have conducted IPOs, and (ii) former large 
reporting companies that have struggled (and as a result, have become 
smaller companies), but that have retained the ability to correct their 
problems and grow back into larger companies. One common factor 
among Growth SRCs is that such companies receive a significant level 
 110. One technique that has been used to measure the innovation advantage from 
rapid-growth start-ups is to examine the patents that come out of companies that have 
received financing from VC funds.  See Samuel Kortum & Josh Lerner, Assessing the 
Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J. ECON. 674, 674-75, 689-91 
(2000) (finding that VC-backed companies produced more patents than non-VC-backed 
companies and the patents the VC-backed firms produced were apparently more 
valuable). 
 111. See MARK VAN OSNABRUGGE & ROBERT J. ROBINSON, ANGEL INVESTING: 
MATCHING START-UP FUNDS WITH START-UP COMPANIES – THE GUIDE FOR 
ENTREPRENEURS, INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS, AND VENTURE CAPITALISTS 22 (2000). 
 112. See Jeffrey E. Sohl, The Early-Stage Equity Market in the USA, 1 VENTURE 
CAPITAL 101, 105 (1999). (“Over the last 4 years [from 1996 to 1999], these high 
growth start-ups added 6 million jobs to an economy that added 7.7 million jobs in total. 
For entrepreneurs, size is a transient characteristic where firms start small (and as such 
receive the small business label) but grow fast.”).  Id; see also DAVID BIRCH ET AL., 
WHO’S CREATING JOBS? 6-7 (1994). 
Most of the new jobs attributable to small firms are thus created by a relatively few 
small firms that start small and grow fast. Said another way, most small firms grow 
slowly. It is not the local drug store or beauty shop or restaurant that is the main 
engine of job growth – it is the Gazelle [Birch’s nickname for “mostly smaller firms 
that start with the intent to grow, and pull it off”]. 
Id.  Gazelles (which accounted for no more than 3% of firms) added 4.4 million jobs to 
the economy between 1989 and 1993, a period when the economy hardly grew.  Id. at 6. 
 113. Furthermore, rapid growth start-ups cull less productive companies and 
industries, a benefit that allows those resources to be redeployed in a higher value-add 
manner.  One study examined the impact of small firms generally on the competition 
level of industries in which they operate.  Joan E. Mitchell, Small Firms: A Critique, 
THREE BANKS REV. 50 (1980).  The essay argues that “small firms have a special role in 
increasing competition” with large firms within an industry, and they can increase the 
competitive level of the industry as a whole.  One reason is that small firms may be less 
inclined to adopt collusive and restrictive practices, which can reduce the competitive 
level of the industry.  Id. at 54-55. 
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of institutional and secondary market support for their securities, 
frequently referred to by academics as support from “securities market 
intermediaries” or “financial intermediaries”.114 Namely, these compa-
nies have meaningful coverage from research analysts115 and a signifi-
cant portion of their outside shareholders are large, institutional invest-
tors (e.g., mutual funds or hedge funds).116 These companies may also 
receive additional secondary support through coverage by the financial 
press and support from investment banks. 
 
Orphan Smaller Reporting Companies (“Orphan SRCs”): These 
smaller reporting companies have little to no meaningful institutional 
support. Orphan SRCs are unlikely to have any meaningful research 
coverage,117 and they are also unlikely to have meaningful ownership 
from large, institutional shareholders.  This category is dominated by (i) 
firms that trade on the Pink Sheets or the OTC Bulletin Board,118 (ii) 
former rapid-growth start-ups that have conducted IPOs, but have since 
proved to be unsuccessful, (iii) former large companies that have strug-
 114. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, A Framework for the Regulation of Securities 
Market Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45 (2004); Orcutt, Angel Finance 
Market, supra note 48. 
 115. Research analysts (aka securities analysts) conduct research on particular 
securities and provide research reports to investors in order to assist their investment 
decisions regarding such securities. Orcutt, Investor Skepticism, supra note 55, 6-10. 
 116. For a discussion of the importance of institutional support for smaller com-
panies, see 26TH ANNUAL SEC GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS FORUM ON SMALL BUSINESS 
CAPITAL FORMATION, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, 109-111 (2006), available at http:// 
www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/2007gbforumproceedings.pdf. 
 117. COFFEE, supra note 40, at 270 (citing statistics provided by Thomson/First 
Call).  (“[O]f the roughly 14,000 publicly-traded companies in the U.S. [including both 
large and smaller companies], fewer than 6,000 are today covered by even a single 
analyst (and less than half of these 6,000 are covered by two or more analysts).”).  Id. 
 118. Pink Sheets – Electronic OTC Markets, Defining the OTC Market and the Pink 
Sheets, http://www.pinksheets.com/pink/otcguide/investors_index.jsp (last visited Jan. 
24, 2009). 
The OTC, or ‘Over-the-Counter,’ market is not an organized marketplace or 
exchange. OTC is a catchall phrase for any market in an equity security that is not 
listed on a US exchange or on the Nasdaq Stock Market. OTC securities are issued by 
companies that either choose not to list, or are unable to meet the standards for listing, 
on NASDAQ or a US stock exchange. OTC equity securities can be quoted on the 
Pink Sheets Electronic Quotation Service, and/or, if the securities are registered with 
the SEC and their issuers are current in their reporting obligation, on the OTC Bulletin 
Board. 
Id. 
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gled so badly that they are unlikely to recover, and (iv) companies that 
have gone public through reverse mergers with public shells.119 
Rather than idealized growth companies, it is Orphan SRCs that 
dominate the smaller companies impacted by Section 404.120  So, while 
small company advocates may wish to improve the operating environ-
ment for Rapid-Growth Start-ups and Growth SRCs by reducing the 
impact of Section 404, they must also account for the impact that such 
regulatory reduction would have on Orphan SRCs and their security 
holders. 
 119. Reverse mergers into public shells are sometimes used as a technique by 
companies to “go public” without conducting an IPO.  Professor Sjostrom offers the 
following explanation: 
A private operating company merges into a non-operating or shell public company.  In 
the merger, the operating company shareholders are issued shares of the shell in 
exchange for the operating company shares.  Post-merger, the former operating 
company shareholders own 80-90% of the shell (which now contains the assets and 
liabilities of the operating company) with the remaining 10-20% owned by the 
existing shell company shareholders (i.e., the shell’s promoter and its affiliates).  The 
shell company’s name is then changed to the name of the operating company, and the 
company’s shares are listed for trading on the Pink Sheets or, if it has at least 200 
shareholders, the OTC Bulletin Board. Where do these public shells come from?  
There are many promoters of public shells out there.  Do a Google search of “public 
shell” and you’ll see what I’m talking about.  These promoters typically incubate their 
own shells—they incorporate a company, voluntarily register its shares under the 
1934 Act, and then timely file with the SEC the required quarterly and annual reports.  
Because the shell has no operations, it’s fairly simple and inexpensive to make these 
filings.  In exchange for letting an operating company merge into a shell, the promoter 
charges the operating company a fee and retains the 10-20% interest in the shell post-
merger.  They pitch the shell as quicker, easier and cheaper way to go public than 
through a conventional IPO . . . The company is now public in the sense that its shares 
are registered with the SEC and quoted on the Pink Sheets or OTC Bulletin Board, but 
it has not received the two primary benefits of going public:  additional equity capital 
and share liquidity.  Merging with a shell does not raise any capital.  As for liquidity, 
no underwriter is helping to develop active trading in the company’s stock, so while 
the shares are technically publicly traded, the market is illiquid.  Nonetheless, the 
company now faces the many disadvantages of being public including increased 
expenses, increased liability exposure, and loss of confidentiality. 
Going Public Through a Public Shell Reverse Merger, Posting of Bill Sjostrom to 
Business Law Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2005/10/going 
_public_th.html (Oct. 30, 2005). 
 120. Based on the Thomson/First Call statistics cited in COFFEE, supra note 40, at 
270, more than 8,000 of the 14,000 publicly-traded companies in the United States have 
no analyst coverage. 
2009 THE CASE AGAINST EXEMPTING 355 
SMALLER REPORTING COMPANIES 
C. Do Smaller Companies have a Greater Need for Section 404? 
As the picture of the smaller companies impacted by Section 404 
becomes clearer – including the fact that the category is dominated by 
Orphan SRCs – the question that follows is whether smaller reporting 
companies have a greater need than larger companies for the services 
provided by Section 404.121  While Section 404 appears to be dispro-
portionately more expensive for smaller reporting companies, is it also 
disproportionately more beneficial? 
1.  The Case for Section 404 being Less  
Beneficial for Smaller Companies 
Rational arguments can be made that Section 404 is less beneficial 
for smaller reporting companies than for larger reporting companies.  
For example, smaller reporting companies are more likely to have 
simpler financial operations,122 which could make it easier for their 
management to have relatively complete and accurate financial data 
without the need for elaborate internal controls.  Additionally, internal 
control structures may be less useful for smaller companies since they 
tend to rely more heavily on top managers for control, who are likely 
able to override the controls irrespective of Section 404.123 
2.  The Case for Section 404 being More  
Beneficial for Smaller Companies 
There are equally rational arguments, however, that smaller 
companies may have a greater need for the services provided by Section 
404.  To begin with, smaller firms have been more likely than large 
companies to find weaknesses in their internal controls.124  Weaker 
 
 121. See, e.g., Kamar et al., supra note 10.  In their study on SOX’s effect on small 
firms, Professors Kamar, Karaca-Mandic, and Talley considered whether small firms 
have greater need for the services provided by Section 404.  Id. at 9-11, 27. 
 122. See, e.g., SEC May 2007 Press Release, supra note 81. 
 123. See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 53-54. 
 124. Jeffrey Doyle, Weili Ge & Sarah McVay, Determinants of Weaknesses in 
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, 44 J. OF ACCT. & ECON. 193, 195 (2007).  
Doyle, Ge & McVay looked at firms disclosing material weaknesses in their internal 
controls under Sections 404 and 302 from August 2002 to August 2005.  Id.  Their 
study found that material weaknesses in internal controls “are more likely for firms that 
are smaller, less profitable, more complex, growing rapidly, or undergoing restruc-
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internal controls increase the potential both for financial fraud and for 
inadvertent financial disclosure inaccuracies.  Not surprisingly, research-
ers have found that smaller reporting companies tend to have a higher 
incidence of accounting restatements than larger firms.125  A 2007 study 
on restatement trends by Glass Lewis & Co. found that restatements by 
companies with market capitalizations of less than $75 million consti-
tuted 50% of financial restatements by reporting companies in 2005 and 
62% in 2006.126 
On a related note, smaller reporting companies – particularly 
Orphan SRCs – are less likely to have strong institutional and secondary 
market support than larger companies.127  This is relevant because such 
institutional and secondary market support is critical to the efficient 
functioning of the market for a particular security.  All securities invest-
ments pose information problems to investors (e.g., investors do not 
have complete and accurate information), as well as agency problems 
(e.g., managers may try to take advantage of their controlling role in the 
corporation to misappropriate a portion of the corporation’s wealth for 
their own private benefit).128 Overcoming these problems requires costly 
information-gathering efforts and monitoring of management.129  For 
reporting companies, however, the presence of diverse shareholders 
complicates these information-gathering and monitoring efforts, and 
leads to a collective action problem.130  Namely, while the benefit to the 
security holders as a whole may justify the cost of gathering and 
assessing information or monitoring management, such cost is greater 
than the benefit that would be received by any one security holder or 
turing.”  Id. at 220; Stephen Bryan & Steven Lilien, Characteristics of Firms with 
Material Weaknesses in Internal Control: An Assessment of Section 404 of Sarbanes 
Oxley (March 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=682363.  “Based upon early 
evidence of firms with material weaknesses, as defined by the Public Accounting 
Oversight Board, we find that firms with material weaknesses are, on average, both 
smaller and worse performers than their matched industry counterparts.”  Id. at 23. 
 125. MARK GROTHE, GLASS LEWIS & CO., THE ERRORS OF THEIR WAYS 8 (Feb. 27, 
2007), available at http://www.pbs.org/nbr/pdf/GlassLewis-Errors.pdf. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
 128. Choi & Fisch, supra note 44, at 271; see also, Cross & Prentice, supra note 44, 
at 339. 
 129. Choi & Fisch, supra note 44, at 271; see also, Cross & Prentice, supra note 44, 
at 339. 
 130. Choi & Fisch, supra note 44, at 271; see also, Cross & Prentice, supra note 44, 
at 339. 
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potential security holder.131  Without a mechanism to spread the costs 
across the security holders (or potential security holders) collectively, 
one should expect a suboptimal level of such activities. 
A common market response to these information, agency and 
collective action problems is the presence of institutional and secondary 
support, which helps to provide the information-gathering and moni-
toring services on behalf of collective groups of security holders.  As a 
result, companies with more institutional and secondary support should 
generally be expected to have more efficient pricing of their securities, 
since they will have a greater level of information-gathering and moni-
toring services provided to their security holders. 
Smaller reporting companies, therefore, face a double problem: 
 
• They are more prone to inaccurate financial disclosure; and 
• They receive less collective information-gathering and moni-
toring services to cope with this increased level of inaccuracy, 
due to their reduced institutional and secondary support. 
 
As a result, smaller companies may actually have a greater need 
than larger companies for Section 404’s collective mechanism for provi-
ding the information gathering and monitoring services that are not 
being adequately provided by the market.132 
PART III: SECTION 404 COMPLIANCE COSTS ARE SUBSTANTIAL 
While doubt may exist about the overall net effect of Section 404 
on smaller companies, there is no doubt that compliance with Section 
404 has turned out to be very expensive. 
 131. Choi & Fisch, supra note 44, at 271.  For example, a single shareholder who 
expends resources individually to monitor management may improve the corporation’s 
management and benefit all of the shareholders of the corporation collectively.  
However, the single shareholder will likely have to bear this cost on its own.  Id. at 278.  
Therefore, while the collective group of shareholders may benefit from this increased 
monitoring, including those that did not bear the cost,  such monitoring will not likely 
take place unless the benefit is so great that it is justified by the individual benefit to the 
single shareholder.  Id. 
 132. See Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 9-11, 27. 
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A. Isolating Impact of Section 404 is Difficult 
Before examining the available evidence about the costs and 
benefits of Section 404, it is necessary to point out that isolating the 
specific impact of Section 404 is an extremely challenging, if not 
impossible, pursuit.133  To begin with, Section 404 has not been imple-
mented in a vacuum, but rather is only one part of SOX’s complex and 
far-reaching set of regulatory reforms.  As companies have adjusted to 
Section 404, they have also been adjusting to a multitude of other 
regulations – many of which are closely related to Section 404, such as 
SOX Section 302’s requirement that CEOs and CFOs individually 
certify their companies’ annual and quarterly Exchange Act reports,134 a 
new audit committee requirement,135 multiple provisions related to man-
agement compensation,136 and a prohibition on auditing firms from pro-
viding certain non-audit services to their auditing clients.137  When 
trying to determine the costs associated with implementing Section 404, 
it is not always clear that researchers have been able to segregate the 
effects of Section 404 from these related regulations, which could false-
ly inflate the costs associated with Section 404.138  At the same time, 
these other various reforms are aimed at reducing the same information 
and agency problems that Section 404 aims to treat, which makes it 
difficult to identify with precision whether benefits attributed to Section 
404 stem solely from Section 404, or partially from Section 404 and 
partially from one of the related measures.139 
Regarding smaller companies, there is the further issue that Section 
 
 133. See id. at 2-3. 
 134. SOX § 302, 15 U.S.C. § 7241. 
 135. SOX § 302 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m) (amending Section 10A of the Exchange 
Act). 
 136. For example, Section 306 of SOX prohibits directors and executive officers 
from trading in their firms’ equity securities during pension fund blackout periods, 15 
U.S.C. § 7244.  Section 402(a) of SOX amends Section 13 of the Exchange Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 78m to prohibit most personal loans by issuers to their directors and executive 
officers.  Section 403 of SOX amends Section 16 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p 
to require directors, officers and beneficial owners of  more than 10% of the issuer’s 
stock to report their trades in the issuer’s securities within two business days of the 
trade. 
 137. SOX § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(g), (h) (amending Section 10A of the Exchange 
Act). 
 138. See generally Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 2-3. 
 139. See generally id. 
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404 has yet to be fully implemented for the smallest public companies 
(i.e., non-accelerated filers).  As a result, there is little direct evidence on 
the specific impact that Section 404 will have on that class of issuers. 
B. Direct Compliance Costs 
Complying with Section 404 involves a number of direct costs for 
issuers that can be grouped into three primary categories:140 
 
Internal costs: The internal people hours that an issuer is required to 
dedicate for complying with Section 404.141 
 
External costs (excluding audit attestation fees): The external 
people hours (e.g., external consultants) and expenses (e.g., purchases of 
improved information technology systems) incurred by the issuer for 
Section 404 compliance, excluding people hours and expenses from the 
issuer’s primary auditor.142 
 
Auditor attestation fees: The amount the issuer pays to receive the 
Auditor’s Internal Control Report. 
 
These direct compliance costs are substantial.  In fact, they have 
proven to be much greater than the SEC’s original forecast of annual 
internal and external costs (excluding auditor attestation fees) of $91,000 
per company.143  For example, Financial Executives International (FEI) 
annually surveys FEI-member executives from public issuers to deter-
mine their direct Section 404 compliance costs.144  These surveys gener-
 
 140. These are three categories employed by Financial Executives International in 
its annual survey on the costs associated with implementing Section 404.  FIN. 
EXECUTIVES INT’L & FIN. EXECUTIVES RESEARCH FOUND., FEI AUDIT FEE SURVEY: 
INCLUDING SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 COSTS, 12, 13, 15 (Apr. 2008) [hereinafter 
FEI 2008 Survey]; FIN. EXECUTIVES INT’L & FIN. EXECUTIVES RESEARCH FOUND., FEI 
SURVEY ON SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 IMPLEMENTATION 3, 11-13 (May 2007) 
[hereinafter FEI 2007 Survey]. 
 141. FEI 2008 Survey, supra note 140, at 5, 6. 
 142. Id. 
 143. SEC Release 33-8238, supra note 5.  For a discussion of the SEC’s 
methodology for that calculation, see supra note 12. 
 144. FEI provides the following description of the methodology for its 2008 and 
2007 surveys.  For its 2008 survey: 
In late March 2008, FEI sent an e-mail invitation to participate in an Internet-based 
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ate roughly 200 responses per year from a range of issuer sizes over the 
first four years following Section 404’s implementation.  The following 
table provides the average results from those surveys for U.S. 
accelerated and large accelerated filers:145 
2004 2005 2006 2007     
  Large accelerated 
filers: 
  
No. of responses to 
survey 
140 136 118 104 
Average internal 
costs
$1,851,545 $1,707,205 $1,200,421 $748,950 
146
Average external costs $2,319,714 $1,790,067 $1,016,204 $263,954 
Average auditor 
attestation fees 
$1,717,134 $1,932,671 $1,599,631 $1,024,649    
Total $5,887,853 $5,429,943 $3,816,256 $2,037,553 
     
  Accelerated filers:   
No. of responses to 
survey 
65 102 54 64 
Average internal 
costs
$389,350 $401,656 $269,725 $250,820 
147
Average external costs $618,613 $680,829 $368,185 $249,236 
Average auditor 
attestation fees 
$547,227 $645,193 $452,737 $550,654    
Total $1,555,190 $1,727,678 $1,090,647 $1,050,710 
 
survey to 3,566 FEI members from publicly-held companies. Those usable responses 
(185) received by April 7, 2008, were included in the survey results. This is a 
response rate of about 5.2%. 
FEI 2008 Survey, supra note 140, at 10. 
For its 2007 survey: 
In early April 2007, FEI sent an e-mail invitation to participate in an Internet-based 
survey to FEI members from publicly-held companies. Those usable responses (200) 
received by April 24, 2007, were included in the survey results. 
FEI 2007 Survey, supra note 140, at 10. 
 145.  Source for the 2007 figures: FEI 2008 Survey, supra note 140, at 12. Source 
for the 2004 – 2006 figures: FEI 2007 Survey, supra note 140, at 13. 
 146. FEI asks respondents to provide the total number of internal people hours that 
are dedicated to Section 404 compliance, then assumes full-time professionals at 2,000 
hours per year at a compensation rate (salary plus benefits) of $100,000 per year.  Id. at 
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It should be noted that surveys are notoriously troublesome and can 
contain serious data distortions, so the findings from the FEI surveys 
should be taken with at least some degree of skepticism.  For example, 
the issuers who chose to participate in the FEI survey changed from year 
to year; yet FEI does not report how much a “different group of firms 
responding to each survey” impacted the change in compliance costs.148  
It also remains unclear whether FEI’s surveys were adequately designed 
to exclude increased costs from Section 302 compliance into its survey 
of Section 404 compliance costs.  Nevertheless, the FEI surveys do pro-
vide credible evidence that Section 404 direct compliance costs are sig-
nificant.  Specifically, Section 404 compliance costs are certainly much 
higher than the $91,000 initially estimated by the SEC.  The FEI surveys 
also support the notion that issuers and auditors may be adapting to 
Section 404 and becoming more efficient at implementing and assessing 
ICFR.  From 2005 to 2007, the FEI surveys show a 62.5% decrease in 
direct compliance costs for large accelerated filers, and a 39.2% 
decrease for accelerated filers. 
Other surveys that have been conducted support these basic in-
sights,149 which can be summarized as follows: 
 
• Section 404 significantly increased accounting and audit costs 
for all companies (both large and small) that have had to comply 
with its provisions. 
• Efficiencies have been achieved by both large and smaller 
issuers that have reduced the direct compliance costs somewhat. 
 
Thus, some of the initial concern over Section 404 direct costs 
appears to have been triggered by one-time, exceptional expenses that 
4, 11-13. 
 147. FEI asks respondents to provide the total number of internal people hours that 
are dedicated to Section 404 compliance, then assumes full-time professionals at 2,000 
hours per year at a compensation rate (salary plus benefits) of $100,000 per year.  Id. at 
4, 11-13. 
 148. Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 12. 
 149. See, e.g., CRA INT’L INC., SARBANES-OXLEY SECTION 404 COSTS AND 
IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES: SPRING 2006 SURVEY (Apr. 17, 2006) available at http://pola 
ris.umuc.edu/~kklose/website/Sox%20404.pdf; CRA INT’L INC., SARBANES-OXLEY 
SECTION 404 COSTS AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES: SURVEY UPDATE (Dec. 8, 2005), 
available at www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/us_investorcenter_CRAIIfinal.pdf. 
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issuers faced in order to develop and implement systems for docu-
menting internal controls that comply with Section 404.  These expenses 
were amplified for smaller companies, as it appears that Section 404 
caused many of them to document their internal controls for the first 
time in the 2004 – 2005 period,150 even though internal accounting con-
trol systems had been required for public companies since 1977.151  
Going forward, it will be interesting to see whether issuers can squeeze 
further efficiencies out of their Section 404 direct compliance costs (the 
SEC is trying to help this initiative via its new interpretive guidelines152 
and AS 5153) or whether the major efficiencies have already been 
captured. 
As non-accelerated filers begin to comply with Section 404, it will 
also be interesting to examine their experience with initial Section 404 
costs.  On the one hand, one should expect their initial development and 
implementation expenses to be somewhat reduced due to the accumu-
lation of knowledge that has been generated by accelerated filers.  On 
the other hand, there are thousands of non-accelerated filers who will 
now need auditor attestations for fiscal years ending on or after 
December 15, 2009.  It is plausible that the increased demand for auditor 
attestations by non-accelerated filers could cause an increase in auditing 
costs generally as auditors seek to meet this increased demand.154 
 150. GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 5. 
 151. Exchange Act §§ 13(b)(2)(A), (B), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A), (B), which were 
implemented as part of the FCPA in 1977.  Section 13(b)(2)(A) requires reporting com-
panies to “make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, 
accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.” 
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).  Section 13(b)(2)(B) requires reporting companies to “devise 
and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable 
assurances that . . . (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation 
of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or 
any other criteria applicable to such statement, and (II) to maintain accountability for 
assets.” 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(ii)(I), (II). 
 152. SEC Interpretive Release 33-8810, supra note 74, at 1. 
 153. Supra note 81. 
 154. See generally Keith Crandell, Board Director for the National Venture Capital 
Association, Written Testimony to House Small Business Committee, Hearing on 
Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Relief (May 4, 2006), available at http://www.nvca.org/ 
pdf/Crandell%20Testimony%205-3-06.pdf. 
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C. Indirect Compliance Costs Difficult to Calculate,  
but may be Substantial 
In addition to its direct compliance costs, which have received 
much attention, Section 404 also involves substantial indirect costs.  
Many of these indirect costs are easy to identify, but unlike the direct 
costs, they are unfortunately much more difficult to value.  One of the 
more commonly cited indirect costs is the management time and energy 
dedicated to Section 404 that could be spent elsewhere.  Professors 
Butler and Ribstein point out that “management energy and resources 
are scarce. What is spent on SOX compliance is not spent on other 
activities that may be more valuable to the firm and to society.”155 
For smaller companies, where senior management is often relied 
upon to actively manage the day-to-day operations of the issuer, these 
lost opportunity costs could be substantial.  According to the GAO 
Report: 
[S]ome of the smaller companies that responded to our survey 
reported that their CFOs and accounting staff spent as much as 90 
percent of their time for the period leading up to their first Section 
404 report on Sarbanes-Oxley Act compliance-related issues. 
Finally, many of the smaller companies incurred missed “opportu-
nity costs” to comply with the act that were significant. For example, 
nearly half (47 percent) of the companies that responded to our sur-
vey reported deferring or canceling operational improvements and 
more than one-third (39 percent) indicated that they deferred or 
cancelled information technology investments.156 
Another commonly-cited indirect cost was expressed by Keith 
Crandell, director for the National Venture Capital Association, in his 
May 4, 2006 testimony before the House Small Business Committee re-
garding the impact of Section 404 on small companies: 
 
 155. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 50. 
 156. GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 17. 
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[A]t a time when small companies need their accounting firms more 
than ever, Section 404 has created an unhealthy motivational shift in 
the accounting profession as it relates to supply and demand. In 
response to Sarbanes-Oxley, the [“Big Four” auditors] I am familiar 
with have shifted their focus on auditing companies of all sizes to 
leveraging lucrative 404 practices at large corporations. Thus they 
are abandoning the smaller companies whose needs are equally as 
critical. 157 
PART IV: WHETHER SECTION 404 IS COST-EFFECTIVE IS LESS CLEAR 
While Section 404’s costs are well-documented, quantifying its 
benefits has proven difficult, which leads critics and supporters to argue 
over the cost-benefit implications of Section 404.158  Critics decry that 
Section 404 “has gone too far” and point to:  (1) the substantial compli-
ance costs, reasoning that it is unrealistic to expect that Section 404 
generates sufficient benefits to offset those costs, and (2) anecdotal evi-
dence that suggests that smaller reporting companies are employing stra-
tegies to avoid being subject to Section 404.  Conversely, proponents for 
Section 404 tend to focus on the beneficial impact that Section 404 
should have on investor protection and on an issuer’s cost of capital.  
This Part IV will attempt to sift through evidence on Section 404’s net 
effect. 
A. Management Surveys Suggest that Section 404 is Cost-Ineffective 
A number of surveys have been conducted asking management of 
issuers subject to Section 404 to provide perceptions of the provision’s 
net effect.  The findings from three of the more frequently cited of those 
management surveys follow. 
1.  FEI Survey 
The FEI surveys covering 2005 and 2006 asked survey participants 
whether the benefits of compliance with Section 404 exceeded their 
costs.  That question generated the following results:159 
 
 
 157. Crandell, supra note 154. 
 158. See CCMR REPORT, supra note 3, at 115. 
 159. FEI 2007 Survey, supra note 140, at 19. 
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 2005 2006 
Large accelerate filers   
Number of responses 136 118 
Benefits of Section 404 exceed 
costs for their company: 
  
Agree 17.7% 21.1% 
Disagree 82.3% 78.9% 
   
Accelerated filers   
Number of responses 102 54 
Benefits of Section 404 exceed 
costs for their company: 
  
Agree 11.2% 23.5% 
Disagree 88.8% 76.5% 
 
Respondents to the FEI survey covering 2007, however, expressed 
“more confidence in the value of Section 404,”160 in particular those 
respondents that were accelerated (rather than large accelerated) filers. 
 
 
 160. FEI 2008 Survey, supra note 140, at 9. 
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 2006161  2007162  2006163  2007164  
Number of Responses 54 64 118 104 
Financial reports are more accurate 
as a result of Section 404: 
    
Agree 33.3% 51.8% 51.4% 49.5% 
Disagree 66.7% 48.2% 48.6% 50.5% 
Financial reports are more reliable 
as a result of Section 404: 
    
Agree 39.2% 55.4% 52.3% 56.4% 
Disagree 60.8% 44.6% 47.7% 43.6% 
Section 404 helped prevent or 
detect fraud: 
    
Agree 29.4% 41.1% 36.4% 45.2% 
Disagree 70.6% 58.9% 63.6% 54.8% 
Section 404 has generated more 
investor confidence in your 
financial reports: 
    
Agree 58.0% 69.1% 60.6% 69.1% 
Disagree 42.0% 30.9% 39.4% 30.9% 
2.  Rittenberg/Miller Survey 
Professor Larry Rittenberg and Patricia Miller published a survey in 
2005 that was aimed at capturing the benefits of Section 404.165  The 
Rittenberg/Miller survey asked participants for their opinion regarding 
the relative costs and benefits associated with Section 404 compliance, 
and generated the following results from 171 respondents (which were 
predominantly larger companies):166 
 
 161. FEI 2007 Survey, supra note 140, at 18. 
 162. FEI 2008 Survey, supra note 140, at 16. 
 163. FEI 2007 Survey, supra note 140, at 18. 
 164. FEI 2008 Survey, supra note 140, at 16. 
 165. Larry E. Rittenberg & Patricia K. Miller, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Work – 
Looking at the Benefits, THE IIA RESEARCH FOUNDATION (Jan. 2005), available at 
http://www.theiia.org/research/research-reports/chronological-listing-research-reports/ 
downloadable-research-reports/?i=248. 
 166. The 171 responses consisted of 54 from companies with more than $6 billion in 
annual sales (or 31.6%), 64 from companies with annual sales between $1 billion and 
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 Ignoring the year-one 
start-up costs and looking 
forward to steady state of 
control assessments 
 
First year effort to 
get ready for 
Section 404 
Costs greatly exceed 
benefits 
37% 6% 
Costs exceed benefits 35% 30% 
Costs equal benefits 14% 25% 
Benefits exceed costs 13% 31% 
 
Benefits greatly exceed 
costs 
1% 8% 
3.  Foley & Lardner Survey 
Foley & Lardner LLP has been conducting annual surveys to gauge 
the impact of corporate governance reform on public companies since 
2003.167  The 2006 survey generated 114 responses from public compa-
nies (33 from issuers with annual revenue of $1 billion or more; 80 from 
issuers with annual revenue of less than $1 billion; 1 company did not 
specify).168 The Foley & Lardner surveys included the following ques-
tion that relates somewhat to the cost/benefits of Section 404:169 
 
$6 billion (or 37.4%), 42 from companies with annual sales between $200 million and 
$1 billion (or 24.6%) and 4 from companies with less than $200 million in annual sales 
(or 2.3%). Seven of the respondents did not report their annual sales.  Id. at 5. 
 167. FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, THE COST OF BEING PUBLIC IN THE ERA OF SARBANES-
OXLEY 18 (June 15, 2006), available at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/ 
FileUpload137/3420/ndi%202006%20public%20study%20FINAL.pdf (Foley & 
Lardner worked with the national research firm KRC Research on the survey). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 12. 
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 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Do you feel that the corporate 
governance and public disclosure 
reforms implemented since the 
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
in 2002 are too strict, or not strict 
enough? 
    
Too strict 55% 67% 82% 82% 
About right 38% 27% 16% 18% 
Not strict enough 5% 2% 2% – 
Don’t know/no answer 3% 4% – 1% 
 
The above responses would seem to reflect a growing dissatis-
faction with SOX reforms and their costs.  In 2006, Foley & Lardner 
included the following two new questions:170 
 
 2006 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: The 
cost of Sarbanes-Oxley Act compliance has resulted in budget 




Don’t know/no answer 1% 
[Only asked of those agreeing with the above statement] To 
what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: The cost of Sarbanes-Oxley Act compliance has 





4.  Interpreting the Findings from the Various Surveys 
Together, these surveys provide very inconclusive evidence regard-
ing Section 404’s net effect and should be interpreted cautiously.  At 
first glance, the surveys seem to offer support to the Section 404 critics, 
as they provide evidence that public company executives do not find 
 
 170. Id. at 14. 
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Section 404 to be cost-effective.  There are a number of problems with 
that conclusion, however. First, the surveys suffer from many of the 
typical problems that plague surveys, such as a small sample size.  More 
significantly, the surveys do not necessarily ask the right party about 
whether Section 404 is cost-effective.  Issuer executives are particularly 
well-suited to determine the costs associated with Section 404, since the 
issuer bears most of the costs associated with Section 404.  Issuer exe-
cutives, however, are not necessarily well-suited to estimate the benefits 
that derive from the provision.  Section 404 is designed primarily to 
benefit investors, not issuer management, so issuer management may be 
less capable of judging the benefits.  Moreover, these executives should 
be expected to be biased against Section 404 for a number of reasons 
wholly unrelated to the actual effectiveness of the regulation.  In parti-
cular, Section 404 generates immediate and concrete monetary costs to 
the issuer, while the benefits, in the form of reduced information and 
agency problems, are not immediate and concrete, and are actually an 
implicit criticism of management’s competence and honesty.  It should 
be expected, therefore, that many executives will want to find that their 
financial data is no more accurate post-Section 404 than it was pre-
Section 404. 
B. Section 404 Avoidance Strategies Also Suggest that  
Section 404 is Cost-Ineffective 
Since SOX applies only to reporting companies, firms that wish to 
avoid Section 404 because they find it cost-ineffective may engage in 
strategies to avoid being a reporting company.  Section 404 critics point 
to three public market trends that developed post-SOX: (i) an increase in 
“going-dark” transactions by smaller reporting companies; (ii) a reduc-
tion in U.S. IPOs by smaller companies; and (iii) an increase in U.S. 
smaller companies conducting IPOs on foreign stock markets (in 
particular the AIM market in London). 
1.  Increase in Going-Dark Transactions 
The Exchange Act subjects companies with a class of registered 
securities (frequently referred to as “reporting” companies) to an elabo-
rate regulatory system that includes periodic reporting requirements171, 
 
 171. Exchange Act § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a); Exchange Act § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 
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federal proxy rules172, federal tender offer rules173, the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act174 and SOX.  For reporting companies that wish to free 
themselves from this regulatory system (including the requirements of 
SOX and Section 404), the Exchange Act also provides them with the 
ability to “deregister” their securities. 
Section 12(g)(4) of the Exchange Act provides that companies with 
a class of registered securities may terminate the registration if the 
number of “holders of record” for that class of securities falls below 
300.175  Interestingly, the provision focuses on “holders of record” rather 
than “beneficial owners.”  The beneficial owner is the person one typi-
cally thinks of as the “real” owner of the security (e.g., the investor who 
purchased the security and enjoys the “benefits” of ownership such as 
collecting dividends and voting the shares),176 while the holder of 
record, in contrast, is the party in whose name the securities are held on 
the books of the issuer or its transfer agent.177  For example, when an 
investor buys securities through a brokerage firm, most brokerage firms 
will hold those securities in “street name,”178 which means the brokerage 
firm will hold the securities in its name, and not in the name of the 
investor.179  Thus, the investor is the beneficial owner of the securities, 
and the brokerage firm is the holder of record.  Because publicly-held 
securities are predominantly held in street name,180 even public compa-
nies of a significant size and with multiple thousands of beneficial share-
holders may still be eligible for deregistration. If the class of securities 
the issuer is trying to deregister is listed on a national securities ex-
78o(d). 
 172. Exchange Act § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n. 
 173. Exchange Act §§ 13(d), (e), 14(d)-(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(e), n(d)-(f). 
 174. FCPA, supra note 45. 
 175. Exchange Act § 12(g)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(4); Exchange Act Rule 12g-4(a), 
17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4(a).  For issuers whose total assets have not exceeded $10 million 
on the last day of each of the issuer’s three most recent fiscal years, the issuer may seek 
to terminate registration for a class of securities when held of record by less than 500 
persons.  Exchange Act Rule 12g-4(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g-4(a). 
 176. Investopedia, “Beneficial owner”, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bene 
ficialowner.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
 177. Exchange Act Rule 12g-5-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g5-1. 
 178. SEC, On-Line Publications for Investors, Holding Your Securities – Get the 
Facts, available at http://sec.gov/investor/pubs/holdsec.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
 179. Id. 
 180. See Hazen, supra note 45, at 329, n. 13. 
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change, the issuer must also delist those securities from that exchange.181 
Issuers can “deregister” through two basic methods: 
 
Going private:  An issuer “goes private” when it discontinues pub-
lic trading of its securities and becomes a private company.182  This 
could be accomplished through a number of techniques, including en-
couraging an unrelated private company to acquire the issuer (e.g., 
through a private equity transaction183), conducting a management buy-
out or conducting a transaction that involves a combination of both.  For 
example, the wave of leveraged-buyouts in the 1980s that were 
conducted by private equity investors (a.k.a. buyout firms) and managers 
were classic examples of “going-private” transactions. 
 
Going dark:  An issuer “goes dark” when it deregisters its securi-
ties, but continues to maintain public trading in those securities through 
the OTC markets.184  Going-dark transactions can be accomplished by 
cashing out enough security holders (typically shareholders) to reduce 
the holders of record to less than 300, but leaving enough beneficial 
owners of the securities to allow for some level of OTC trading. 
 
 181. There are ten securities exchanges registered with the SEC as national 
securities exchanges under Section 6 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78f: New York 
Stock Exchange, Nasdaq Stock Market LLC, American Stock Exchange, Boston Stock 
Exchange, Chicago Board Options Exchange, Chicago Stock Exchange, International 
Securities Exchange, National Stock Exchange (formerly the Cincinnati Stock 
Exchange), NYSE Arca (formerly the Pacific Stock Exchange) and the Philadelphia 
Stock Exchange.  For a helpful discussion on delisting, see BAINBRIDGE GUIDE TO SOX, 
supra note 10, at 223-34. 
 182. Christian Leuz, Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Really this Costly? A 
Discussion of Evidence from Event Returns and Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. 
& ECON., 146, 149 (2007). 
 183. This Article is using the term “private equity” as it is commonly employed in 
the U.S. financial markets. Namely, private equity refers to large buyout funds (e.g., 
The Blackstone Group, The Carlyle Group, KKR, or the Texas Pacific Group) that seek 
to acquire a substantial ownership stake in operating companies. In addition to 
providing financial capital, private equity investors typically take a very active role in 
the management of the firms in which they invest.  See, e.g., Private Equity: Frequently 
Asked Question, http://www.privateequitycouncil.org/just-the-facts/private-equity 
frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
 184. Leuz, supra note 182, at 149. 
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In addition to regulatory avoidance, a multitude of other reasons 
can motivate a reporting company to “go private,”185 including the bene-
fit of managerial expertise or other synergies of a strategic partner, or 
the desire to undertake a higher risk strategy for the firm that might not 
be appreciated by external shareholders.  Going-dark transactions, 
however, appear to be motivated entirely by a desire for regulatory 
avoidance. 
(a) Available Data 
A number of studies have been conducted to try to determine 
whether deregistrations increased post-SOX, potentially indicating that 
firms were seeking to avoid being subject to SOX.  While the various 
studies employed different methodologies, they universally found a 
substantial increase in post-SOX deregistrations.  The following are 
summaries of five such studies. 
(1)  Leuz, Triantis and Wang Study 
Professors Christian Leuz, Alexander Triantis and Tracy Wang 
compared a sample of 484 firms that went dark and 436 firms that went 
private between January 1998 and December 2004 to a sample of firms 
that remained reporting companies.186  Leuz, Triantis and Wang found a 
significant increase in going-dark transactions in 2003 and 2004,187 but 
no discernable increase in going-private transactions during that 
period.188  The study also found that going-dark firms tend to exhibit the 
following characteristics: 
? They are smaller firms.189 
? They have “poorer stock market performance, higher leverage, 
and fewer growth opportunities than the population of firms that 
could but choose not to go dark. They also exhibit higher levels 
of distress and experience a decline in capital market interest.”190 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Christian Leuz, Alexander Triantis & Tracy Wang, Why do Firms Go Dark? 
Causes and Economic Consequences of Voluntary SEC Deregistrations, 45 J. ACCT. & 
ECON. 181, 187-89 (2008). 
 187. Id. at 189. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 190, 204. 
 190. Id. at 204. Distress was measured by examining:  (1) a distress score from a 
bankruptcy prediction model; (2) increases in short-term debt; (3) unreported 
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? They have a lower level of institutional ownership.191 
? Finally, they have “larger (positive and negative) accruals rela-
tive to their cash flow from operations (consistent with poorer 
accounting quality and hiding motives), larger free cash flow 
problems, and weaker board governance and outside moni-
toring.”192 
 
Based on their findings, Leuz, Triantis and Wang concluded that 
many firms went dark “in response to poor future prospects, financial 
distress and increased compliance costs after SOX.”193  They also found 
“evidence suggesting that controlling insiders take their firms dark to 
protect private control benefits and decrease outside scrutiny, particu-
larly when governance and investor protection are weak.”194 
(2)  Engel, Hayes and Wang Study 
Professors Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes and Xue Wang examined 
a sample of 470 firms that went private or went dark from January 1998 
through May 2005195 and filed a Schedule 13E-3.196  The study did not 
include foreign private issuers or firms that deregistered due to 
liquidation or bankruptcy.  Engel, Hayes and Wang found an increase in 
the quarterly frequency of deregistrations – including both going-private 
and going-dark transactions – after the passage of SOX.197  In analyzing 
the data, however, Professors Kamar, Karaca-Mandic and Talley found 
that the increase became insignificant when going-dark transactions 
regressions showing a large drop in Return on Assets; and (4) a lower cash to total 
assets ratio.  Id. at 191.  For details on the bankruptcy prediction model, see James A. 
Ohlson, Financial Ratios and the Probabilistic Prediction of Bankruptcy, 18 J. ACCT. 
RES. 109 (1980). 
 191. Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 193, 194, n.13. 
 192. Id. at 205. 
 193. Id. at 181. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Ellen Engel, Rachel M. Hayes & Xue Wang, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
Firms’ Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON., 116, 125-26 (2007). 
 196. Schedule 13E-3s under the Exchange Act are filed for transactions conducted 
under Exchange Act Rule 13e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3. Rule 13e-3 transactions 
involve deregistrations conducted by an issuer or its affiliates as opposed to an outsider. 
Rule 13e-3(a)(3), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(a)(3). 
 197. Engel et al., supra note 195, at 143. 
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were excluded.198  Finally, Engel, Hayes and Wang found that smaller 
firms with high insider ownership that announced their deregistration 
post-SOX experienced higher returns at the announcement than similar 
firms that announced their deregistration pre-SOX,199 which could 
indicate that SOX was imposing a net negative effect on the de-
registering companies. 
(3)  GAO Report 
The GAO Report included a deregistration analysis as part of its 
study on the impact of SOX on smaller reporting companies.200  The 
GAO Report examined deregistrations (both going-private and going-
dark transactions) that took place from 1998 through the first quarter of 
2005.201  The report did not, however, include firms that deregistered 
securities other than common stock, companies that were headquartered 
in a foreign country, or companies that deregistered due to merger into 
another company, bankruptcy or liquidation.202  The GAO Report found 
that deregistrations increased from 143 in 2001 to 245 in 2004203 – al-
though the numbers are slightly lower if blank check204 and shell 
companies205 are excluded.206  In addition to noting an increase in dere-
gistrations, the GAO Report analyzed the reasons that companies 
 198. Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 19. 
 199. Engel et al., supra note 195, at 143. 
 200. GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 21-25, 73-83. 
 201. Id. at 22. 
 202. Id. 74-77. 
 203. Id. at 21, 76. 
 204. “A blank check company is a development stage company that has no specific 
business plan or purpose or has indicated its business plan is to engage in a merger or 
acquisition with an unidentified company or companies, other entity, or person.”  Blank 
Check Companies, http://www.sec.gov/answers/blankcheck.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 
2009). 
 205. A shell company is a reporting company “with no or nominal operations and 
either no or nominal assets, assets consisting solely of cash and cash equivalents, or 
assets consisting of any amount of cash and cash equivalents and nominal other assets.”  
SEC, Final Rule: Use of Form S-8, Form 8-K, and Form 20-F by Shell Companies, 
Release Nos. 33-8587, 34-52038, Int’l Series Release No. 1293, 17 C.F.R. Parts 230, 
239, 240, 249 (July 15, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8587.pdf. 
 206. GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 76-77. 
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reported for deregistering.207  The following table provides a summary 























 (% of companies that cited it as a reason for their deregistration) 
Q1 
2005 
62.2 28.9 28.9 8.9 27.8 
2004 52.7 25.7 28.6 15.9 38.4 
2003 57.8 27.5 38.5 21.3 31.6 
2002 44.4 13.9 35.4 22.9 45.1 
2001 32.2 13.3 31.5 23.8 49.0 
2000 20.0 11.1 32.2 37.8 38.9 
1999 33.3 12.2 33.3 42.2 37.8 
1998 12.3 5.3 14.0 26.3 54.4 
 
The most striking result from the “reasons” study is the significant 
increase in companies that attribute their decision to deregister to the 
costs associated with being a reporting company, coupled with a corres-
ponding decrease in companies citing private company benefits. 
Finally, the GAO Report analyzed where companies that de-
registered from July 2003 through the end of March 2005 were trading 

















1.8% 5.3% 13.6% 17.6% 24.8% 36.9% 
 
 
 207. The GAO used various sources to identify these reported reasons, including 
SEC filings, press releases and newswire announcements.  Id. at 79. 
 208. Id. at 23. 
 209. Id. at 24-25. 
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212 
(4) Block Study 
Professor Stanley B. Block surveyed 110 formerly Nasdaq-listed 
companies that deregistered (including both going-private and going-
dark transactions) between January 2001 and July 2003 to determine 
why they deregistered.210  Ninety-six of the firms that participated in the 
Block study had market capitalizations below $100 million prior to 
deregistering.211  The survey generated the following primary reasons 
for deregistration:
 
 No. of companies that 
responded it was the primary 
reason for deregistering 
Cost of being public as opposed to being 
private 
33 
Pressures and time constraints for top 
management 
21 
Lack of coverage by security analysts 19 
Absence of liquidity in the public market 14 
No opportunity for a secondary market 12 
Threat of delisting by the Nasdaq market 11 
 
(5)  Marosi and Massoud Study 
Finally, Professors András Marosi and Nadia Massoud examined a 
sample of 406 firms that deregistered from 1996 through May 2004 to 
determine why they went dark.  Marosi and Massoud did not include 
firms that filed a Form 15 to deregister only their preferred stock or 
publicly traded bonds, foreign companies, or companies that deregis-
tered due to merger, bankruptcy or liquidation.213  The study found that 
the recent deregistration trend is primarily a going-dark phenomenon, 
“[u]nlike the wave of LBOs in the 1980s and 1990s.”214  They also 
 
 210. Stanley B. Block, The Latest Movement to Going Private: An Empirical Study, 
14 J. APPLIED FIN. 36, 36 (2004). 
 211. Id. at 38. 
 212. Id. at 40. 
 213. András Marosi & Nadia Massoud, Why Do Firms Go Dark?, 42(2) J. FIN.& 
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 421, 426 (2007). 
 214. Id. at 423. 
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found that “firms with fewer growth opportunities, greater insider 
ownership, lower institutional ownership, lower market momentum, and 
higher leverage are . . . more likely to go dark”215 and that the audit costs 
of complying with SOX were “among the major driving forces behind a 
firms’ decision to go dark.”216 
(b) Basic Picture of Post-SOX Deregistration Phenomenon 
The above studies yield the following basic picture of the recent 
deregistration phenomenon: 
 
The Post-SOX increase in deregistrations has been driven by going-
dark transactions:  There is little doubt that deregistrations increased 
following the enactment of SOX.  Unlike the deregistration trend in the 
1980s and 1990s, however, which primarily involved LBO-driven 
going-private transactions, the post-SOX increase in deregistrations 
stemmed from going-dark transactions.217 
 
Smaller, weaker firms have gone dark:  Going-dark firms have been 
predominantly smaller firms.218  Moreover, these going-dark firms have 
also tended to be “weaker” firms. Specifically, they tend to have weaker 
recent stock performance, higher leverage, and exhibit higher distress.  
They also tend to have lower growth opportunities and frequently decide 
to go dark after experiencing a decline in capital market value.219  While 
some of the going-dark firms were listed on one of the major markets in 
the United States (i.e., NYSE, Nasdaq or Amex), a substantial per-
centage of the post-SOX going-dark firms were not.  Instead, they were 
trading over-the-counter on either the OTC Bulletin Board or the Pink 
Sheets, or had no public trading market at all.220  Presumably, these 
companies were never listed on a major market because they were not 




 215. Id. at 441. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 189; Marosi & Massoud, supra note 213, at 423. 
 218. Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 190, 204. 
 219. Id. at 204; Marosi & Massoud, supra note 213, at 441. 
 220. GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 24-25. 
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Going-dark firms suffered from greater agency problems:  The 
going-dark firms appear to present greater agency problems to external 
equity investors.  First, going-dark firms had fewer independent direc-
tors,221 which increased the opportunities for insiders to capture the 
firm’s assets at the expense of outside shareholders.  Going-dark firms 
also tended to have fewer effective external mechanisms for monitoring 
management performance, as these firms tended to have a lower level of 
institutional ownership.222  Finally (and not surprisingly, once one con-
siders the greater agency problems), going-dark firms tended to have 
poorer accounting quality.223 
 
Going-dark firms cited regulatory burden as a significant factor in 
their decision to go dark: While companies cite a number of reasons for 
going dark, the direct costs associated with being a public company, 
including the audit costs required to comply with SOX, is one of the 
most frequently cited reasons.224 
(c) Impact of SOX (and Section 404) – Possible Interpretations 
Interpreting this data to determine the impact that SOX and Section 
404 had on the going-dark phenomenon is not a simple task.  Quite 
simply, a multitude of factors affected firms’ decisions to go dark, and 
there is no mechanism for specifically isolating the effect of SOX or 
Section 404.225  For example, consider the substantial number of going-
dark firms that had never been listed on a major stock market and had 
instead always been relegated to the OTC Bulletin Board or the Pink 
Sheets.  Since securities that trade on those markets frequently suffer 
from substantial liquidity problems and are less likely to be attractive as 
targets for potential acquisitions, the poor quality of their public market 
experience may have been the primary driver in their decision to go 
dark, irrespective of the implementation of SOX. 
Accepting the difficulty in isolating the specific impact of SOX and 
Section 404, there are a few plausible theories that have been offered to 
explain SOX’s impact on the going-dark phenomenon and which find 
 
 221. See Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 194. 
 222. See id. at 193, 194, n.13. 
 223. See id. at 205. 
 224. See GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 23; Block, supra note 210, at 37, 40; 
Marosi & Massoud, supra note 213, at 441. 
 225. See Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 2-3. 
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support in the available data.  Two of the more prominent theories will 
be referred to in this Article as (1) the “cost saving” hypothesis226 and 
(2) the “private benefits” hypothesis.227 
(1)  Cost Saving Hypothesis 
The cost saving hypothesis looks at the net effect of SOX and 
Section 404 on public issuers and assumes that an issuer’s management 
will be motivated solely by its duty to maximize shareholder value.228  
Under this theory, a public issuer’s management will look to deregister 
if it determines that the additional costs imposed by SOX cause the total 
costs associated with being a reporting company to outweigh the 
benefits.229  Since Section 404 is generally considered to be the most 
expensive of SOX’s provisions, it could be the tipping point that causes 
management to determine that the public securities regulatory scheme 
has now become too costly.  In short, one can view the cost saving 
hypothesis as an attempt by management to “increase shareholder value 
by ceasing to file with the SEC when the net benefit of such reporting 
has become negative.”230 
The available data supports the cost saving hypothesis in a number 
of ways.  The data strongly suggests that going-dark companies have a 
decreased ability to access the public capital markets for further capital 
due to their weak performance.  It is also possible that going-dark com-
panies have less need for accessing the public equity markets due to 
their tendency toward lower growth rates.  Since external equity is typi-
cally used to fund an issuer’s projected growth, companies with low-
growth potential should be expected to have less need for such external 
equity funding.  All told, the available data suggests that, on a relative 
basis, going-dark companies may not derive a very high level of benefit 
from being a reporting company.231  At the same time, going-dark com-
panies appear to be the least capable of absorbing the additional regula-
tory costs imposed by SOX and Section 404, since: (1) their tendency 
toward economic distress indicates they are less likely to be able to deal 
with the increased burden, and (2) their small size suggests that the 
 226. Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 185. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id.; Engel et al., supra note 195, at 118. 
 230. Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 185. 
 231. Id. at 204. 
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dere
espective of any 
additional costs generated by Section 404 compliance. 
(2) Private Benefits Hypothesis 
234  The Leuz, Triantis and Wang study describes the 
theory as follows: 
 
regulatory burden hits them disproportionately harder than larger firms.  
The GAO Report’s survey evidence provides further support for the cost 
saving hypothesis, as it indicates that the costs associated with being a 
public company – including the audits costs required to comply with 
SOX – were a significant determinant in firms’ decisions to 
gister.232 
It is important to note, however, that SOX is not the only factor that 
can change the balance between the costs and benefits of being a report-
ing company.  There are a multitude of factors wholly unrelated to 
Section 404 that might reduce the benefits of being a reporting company 
so dramatically that it is no longer cost-effective to be a reporting com-
pany.233  Consider a Pink Sheet company with the following realistic 
characteristics:  (1) the issuer operates in a sector that is currently not 
favored by the market; (2) the issuer has no analyst coverage; (3) there is 
limited secondary-market liquidity for its shares, and manipulative se-
condary trading practices appear to be taking place involving the issuer’s 
shares; and (4) the issuer’s profitability recently took a hit and the issuer 
forecasts slower growth going forward.  In such a setting, the net benefit 
of being a reporting company may be negative, irr
The private benefits hypothesis offers a plausible alternative theory 
to the cost saving hypothesis.  Under the private benefits hypothesis, 
management does not receive the altruistic assumption that they will 
focus solely on maximizing shareholder value.  Instead, the private be-
nefits rationale considers whether the decision to go dark may be driven 
instead by “insiders’ interests, rather than the pursuit of [higher] 
shareholder value.”
Controlling insiders, such as managers or large owners, could take 
the firm dark to avoid the outside scrutiny that comes with, or is 
greatly facilitated by, SEC reporting. After going dark, insiders may 
increase their private benefits of control, including perk con-
sumption, loans on favorable terms, generous compensation pack-
 232. See GAO REPORT, supra note 91, at 21-23. 
 233. See Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 21. 
 234. Leuz et al., supra note 186, at 185. 
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ered company, which in turn can 
trigger the decision to go dark.235 
onitoring manage-
ment performance, and poorer accounting quality.236 
(3) Addressing the Lemons Problem 
e smaller companies that are able to remain 
repo
 
ages, the investment of free cash flows into projects that serve 
insiders’ interests, or self-dealing with other companies in which 
insiders hold stakes. And even for firms that generate little cash that 
insiders could directly or indirectly appropriate, going dark can offer 
insiders more entrenchment and less outsider interference. Without 
SEC reporting, it is easier to extract and protect these private 
benefits, and the expected (private) costs of detection are lower. 
Conversely, regulatory events that extend firms’ reporting require-
ments or strengthen their enforcement . . . can increase the expected 
costs to insiders of being a regist
In short, the private benefits hypothesis predicts that companies that 
suffer from greater agency problems and private control benefits should 
be expected to implement regulatory avoidance strategies (such as going 
dark) when regulations improve outsiders’ ability to detect and take 
action against those problems.  The available going-dark data also sup-
ports the private benefits hypothesis, as going-dark firms have tended to 
suffer from greater agency problems.  As noted earlier, these firms tend 
to have greater concentrations of inside shareholders, fewer independent 
directors, fewer effective external mechanisms for m
We are left, then, with two plausible theories that offer different 
explanations for SOX’s role in the going-dark phenomenon.  Under the 
cost saving rationale, SOX may have harmed smaller companies by 
disproportionately increasing their regulatory burden and making it too 
expensive for them to remain as reporting companies.  Even if that is the 
case, some have questioned whether that is actually a bad outcome.237  
The key factor for going-dark firms may not be their smallness, but 
rather their “weakness.”  Perhaps encouraging these weaker firms to de-
register provides a signal not only of their weakness, but also of the 
greater strength of thos
rting companies.238 
Under the private benefits hypothesis, SOX and Section 404 can 
 235. Id. 
 236. See supra Part IV.B.1.(a)-(b). 
 237. See, e.g., Kamar et al., supra note 10, at 9-11, 27. 
 238. See id. 
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chasing away 
companies with weaker corporate governance structures: 
 
protection for precisely those shareholders who need it most.239 
urities that do not meet 
mini
small-
er companies to differentiate themselves from the weaker ones.240 
2.  Substantial Decrease in U.S. IPOs by Smaller Companies 
 
also be viewed in a positive light, as the increased regulation can be 
interpreted as providing an improved mechanism for monitoring man-
agement performance, which once again will tend to encourage weaker 
companies to flee this increased scrutiny.  Professors Butler and Ribstein 
raise a legitimate concern about this outcome of 
Even before SOX, insiders could try to avoid disclosure obligations 
by going private and dark. But SOX’s higher disclosure costs now 
give them a legitimate explanation. Even if this is the real expla-
nation, SOX would be indirectly causing a loss of securities law
This author suggests, however, that the real culprit for increasing 
corporate governance requirements (thereby chasing out weaker compa-
nies), in such a scenario is not Section 404. Instead, the real culprits are 
Exchange Act Sections 12(g)(1) and (4) and Rules 12g-1 and -4, for 
focusing on “record” holders rather than “beneficial” holders, thereby 
allowing for public secondary markets in sec
mum standards for corporate governance. 
All told, if Section 404 serves to encourage weaker small 
companies to leave the public markets – particularly if problems with 
Exchange Act Section 12(g)(1) and (4) and Rules 12g-1 and -4 are 
resolved – that could help to reduce a potential lemons problem for 
smaller companies, by creating a mechanism that allows stronger 
If Section 404 is as cost-ineffective as many of its critics claim it to 
be, its impact should be felt by more than just existing public companies.  
Private companies that are in a position to access the U.S. public 
markets through an IPO and become reporting companies should also be 
expected to exhibit SOX-avoidance strategies.  Specifically, if a signifi-
cant number of IPO-eligible private companies actively seek to avoid 
U.S. IPOs, that phenomenon could be another indication that Section 
 239. BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 55. 
 240. The impact of asymmetric information on markets and the resulting “lemons 
problem” can be traced back to George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality, 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
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 table sets forth summary data for the U.S. IPO market since 
1990 241 
 
Year Num U.S. 
I
Aggregate Proceeds 
404’s costs are not justified.  In fact there is evidence to suggest that 





2007 159 $35.63 billion 
2006 157 $30.48 billion 
2005 161 $28.33 billion 
2004 174 $31.53 billion 
2003 63 $9.58 billion 
2002 66 $22.03 billion 
2001 80 $34.30 billion 
2000 382 $65.11 billion 
1999 477 $64.79 billion 
1998 284 $33.80 billion 
1997 474 $31.59 billion 
1996 675 $42.25 billion 
1995 458 $30.16 billion 
1994 405 $17.40 billion 
1993 490 $29.29 billion 
1992 397 $21.92 billion 
1991 280 $14.16 billion 
1990 110 $4.27 billion 
 
The year 2000 (and more precisely, the close of the first quarter of 
2000) marked the end of one of the hottest IPO markets in U.S. history.  
The fact that the window shut on a hot IPO market, however, is nothing 
exceptional.  IPO markets are highly volatile and have always gone 
through hot periods and cold periods.242  In particular, a cold stock 
market should be expected to trigger a cold IPO market.  In 2001 and 
 
 241. Jay R. Ritter, Some Factoids About the 2008 IPO Market 2 (Working Paper, 
Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/IPOs2008Factoids.pdf [herein-
after Ritter, 2008 IPO Market].  Ritters study and the table above excludes IPOs with an 
offer price of less than $5.00, as well as IPOs involving unit offers, closed-end funds, 
REITs, partnerships, banks and S&Ls, and stocks not listed on CRSP (which includes 
Amex, NYSE, and NASDAQ stocks). 
 242. See infra notes 248-52 and accompanying text. 
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2002, the major stock indices (i.e., the Dow Jones, the S&P 500 and the 











769 -50.5% 1,553 
(3/24/0
Nasdaq 





In such an environment, a cold IPO market should be expected.  A 
company will typically seek investment capital when its free cash flows 
are insufficient to fund the company’s growth opportunities.  An IPO is 
one such mechanism for seeking investment capital.  Because invest-
ment capital is a scarce resource relative to its need, sources of invest-
ment capital naturally demand a price for use of their capital.244  In an 
IPO, investors charge that price by demanding an ownership percentage 
of the company in exchange for their funds.  Just like with any other 
good or service, however, the price of IPO investment capital can 
fluctuate substantially over time.  When the public stock markets are 
“hot”, public investors are indicating a desire to part with their invest-
ment capital more readily and at valuations that are more favorable to 
issuers (i.e., an issuer will be required to part with a smaller percentage 
of the company in order to obtain the investment capital).245  In such a 
setting, the cost of equity will be cheaper for many issuers.  When the 
public stock markets are “cold”, the inverse is true.246  In a cold market, 
public investors are indicating a reduced demand for acquiring public 
 
 243. Yahoo! Finance, http://finance.yahoo.com (select specific index under “Market 
Summary,” then “Historical Prices”) [hereinafter Historical Prices]. 
 244. Simply put, there are more parties that would like to receive investment capital 
than there is available investment capital. In order to be motivated to part with their 
investment capital, these sources of capital will charge the potential users of capital a 
price (the cost of capital) to compensate for its use. 
 245. See generally Douglas Cumming & Jeffrey MacIntosh, Boom, Bust, and 
Litigation in Venture Capital Finance, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 867, 877 (2004). 
 246. See generally id. 
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this light, the lack of IPOs in 2001 and 2002 is very under-
stand




equity, which means the cost of equity will be more expensive for 
issuers (i.e., an issuer will be required to part with a greater percentage 
of the company in order to obtain the investment capital).  Since the 
primary reason for conducting an IPO is typically to obtain investment 
capital to pursue growth opportunities, an issuer should only conduct an 
IPO when the cost of equity from the IPO is justified by the expected 
returns from the growth opportunities.  Where the cost of equity is parti-
cularly expensive, one should expect to see fewer IPOs, as it will require 
substantially greater growth opportunities to justify conducting the IPOs. 
Viewed in 
able. 
What is remarkable is how long the U.S. IPO market has remained 
cold.  In particular, it is surprising to see the U.S. IPO market remain so 
cold during a period when the U.S. public stock markets experienced a 
substantial recovery, which should indicate that a more favorable cost of 
equity would be available for IPO issuers.  The following table sets forth 
the year-end clos
 Year End Close
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Dow Jones      8,342 10,454 10,783 10,717 12,463 13,265
S&P 500 880 1,112 1,212 1,248 1,418 1,468 
Nasdaq 
Com te 
1,336 2,003 2,175 2,205 2,415 2,652 
posi
 
The Dow Jones, S&P 500 and Nasdaq indices each increased from 
2003 – 2007 resulting in the following cumulative increases:248 
 
 
 of 2002 – Close of 2007 
% Increase:  
Close
Dow Jones 59.0% 
S&P 500 66.8% 
Nasdaq Composite 98.5% 
 
In spite of this strong post-2002 market growth, the U.S. IPO 
 
 247. See Historical Prices, supra note 243. 
 248. Id. 
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s, 
therefore, clearly stems from fewer U.S. IPOs by smaller companies. 
(a)  Section 404 may Render Cost of IPO Equity too Expensive
market remained cold. More specifically, the U.S. IPO market remained 
“ice cold” for smaller companies.  From 2001 – 2007, the U.S. IPO 
market posted seven consecutive years with less than 200 IPOs being 
completed.  Prior to 2001 the last time that less than 200 IPOs were 
completed in a year was 1990 and only three times during that 11-year 
span were less than 300 IPOs completed.249  If one eliminates 1999 and 
2000 as bubble years, the aggregate proceeds raised by IPOs in 2004 
recovered to a very respectable level and maintained that level through 
2007, despite the drop in number of the number IPOs compared to the 
pre-2001 era.  It does not appear, therefore, that large IPOs for large 
companies have disappeared; there were twenty IPOs conducted in 2007 
with deal sizes of $500 million or more for an aggregate deal size of 
more than $20 billion.250  The big reduction in the number of IPO
 
regarding Section 404’s impact on smaller 
companies, as follows: 
 
Section 404 critics argue that the increase in costs imposed by 
SOX, and specifically by Section 404, is a significant reason for the fail-
ure of the U.S. IPO market to rebound for smaller companies.  Mark 
Heesen, President of the National Venture Capital Association, des-
cribed the problem during his June 2007 testimony to the House Small 
Business Committee 
[W]e are now seeing companies that have a high enough profit run 
rate to consider an IPO choosing to be acquired instead. They want 
to rid themselves of the SOX burden [his testimony focused 
particularly on Section 404’s burden] which currently remains for 
smaller public companies. The result is a long list of companies that 
should have been stand alone economic contributors being absorbed 
into larger entities. Rather than an IPO on a US exchange being the 
ultimate achievement for a venture backed company, it has now 
 249. Ritter, 2008 IPO Market, supra note 241, at 2. 
 250. Renaissance Capital IPO Home.com, Largest IPOs, http://www.ipohome.com/ 
marketwatch/biggest.asp (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).  The two biggest IPOs were the 
June 2007 $4.1 billion IPO by The Blackstone Group and the July 2007 $2.9 billion 
IPO by MF Global Ltd.  THE BLACKSTONE GROUP L.P., 2007 PROSPECTUS 424(b)(4),  
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1393818/000104746907005160/ 
a2178575z424b4.htm; MF GLOBAL LTD., 2007 PROSPECTUS 424(b)(4),  available at 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1401106/000119312507158324/d424b4.htm. 
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t 
value, jobs and revenues would have been diluted substantially. 251 
ion for issuers due to the greater 
trans
IPOs that were conducted by 
“sma er” companies in November 2007: 
 
 
become, at best, one of many options to be considered and, at worst, 
an outcome that is actually avoided. Imagine if Google had been 
acquired by Microsoft, or Dell by Compaq, or Genentech acquired 
by J&J. Perhaps the innovation would have survived but the marke
In effect, Section 404 critics like Heesen argue that Section 404 has 
substantially increased the cost of equity for potential IPO issuers by 
increasing the regulatory cost of conducting an IPO (and being a 
reporting company) without a sufficient corresponding benefit from 
Section 404, such as improved valuat
parency required by Section 404. 
To provide some numbers to place this argument in context, 
consider the following examples of two 
ll
 251. Mark G. Heesen, President, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, Testimony before the 
House Small Business Committee, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404: Will the SEC and 
PCAOB’s New Standards Lower Compliance Costs for Small Companies (June 5, 
2007), available at http://www.nvca.org/pdf/mheesen-testimony-6-5-07.pdf. 
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Description of Issuer 
from Prospectus: 
A leading provider of on-
demand automated voice 
messaging solutions.
 
 252. SOUNDBITE COMMC’NS PROSPECTUS 424(b)(1), at 1, available at http://www. 
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1163698/000095013507006649/b64836b1e424b1.htm 
(last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
 253. NANOSPHERE PROSPECTUS 424(b)(4), at 1, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 





and markets an advanced 
molecular diagnostics 
platform that enables 
simple, low cost and 
highly sensitive genomic 
and protein testing on a 
single platform.253




256 257Amount Sold to 
Public: 
$41,616,176 $98,000,000 
258 259 Post-Money IPO 
Valuation of Issuer: 
$119,950,744 $295,665,580
  
 Direct Costs 
Associated with IPO: 
 
Underwriting discount $2,913,132 $6,401,250 
SEC registration fee $2,966 $3,955 
FINRA fee $10,160 $13,380 
NASDAQ Global 
Market listing fee 
$100,000 $100,000 
Printing & mailing fee $125,000 $350,000 
Legal fees & expenses $825,000 $1,600,000 
Accounting fees & 
expenses 
$1,050,000 $1,150,000 
Transfer agent & 
registrar fees 
$15,000 $3,500 
Miscellaneous $71,874 $237,540 
260 261Total direct costs $5,113,132 $9,859,625 
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Let us make two further assumptions to complete the picture: 
 
? Two-thirds of the issuer’s IPO accounting fees and expenses 
were due to Section 404 compliance: $700,000 for SoundBite 
and $766,667 for Nanosphere. 
? On a going-forward basis, each issuer will annually incur an 
additional $1,000,000 of accounting and auditing expenses 
(internal, external and auditor attestation fees) due to Section 
404. 
 
Based on these assumptions – which coincide with the available 
data on Section 404 compliance costs (and could possibly overstate 
those costs) – each of the issuers will incur slightly under $6 million 
over the next five years in Section 404 compliance costs.262  Let us 
further assume that Section 404 is highly cost-ineffective and generates 
only $1 of benefits to an issuer and its shareholders for every $3 of 
direct costs incurred to comply with the regulation.  Given such facts, 
each of these companies will waste approximately $4 million over the 
next five years for the right to be a reporting company.  Further, that 
Jan. 14, 2009). 
 254. SOUNDBITE COMMC’NS PROSPECTUS 424(b)(1), supra note 252, at cover page. 
 255. NANOSPHERE PROSPECTUS 424(b)(4), supra note 253, at cover page. 
 256. SOUNDBITE COMMUNICATIONS PROSPECTUS 424(b)(1), supra note 252, at cover 
page. 
 257. NANOSPHERE PROSPECTUS 424(b)(4), supra note 253, at cover page. 
 258. SOUNDBITE COMMC’NS PROSPECTUS 424(b)(1), supra note 252, at 4 (multiplied 
the common stock to be outstanding after the offering, or 14,993,843 shares excluding 
the underwriters’ over-allotment option, by the public offering price of $8.00 per share). 
 259. NANOSPHERE PROSPECTUS 424(b)(4), supra note 253, at cover page, 6 
(multiplied the common stock to be outstanding after the offering, or 21,118,970 shares 
excluding the underwriters’ over-allotment option, by the public offering price of 
$14.00 per share). 
 260. SOUNDBITE COMMC’NS REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-1/A (filed with 
the SEC on Nov. 1, 2007), Part II, Item 13 at II-1, available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
Archives/edgar/data/1163698/000095013507006582/b64836a8sv1za.htm. 
 261. NANOSPHERE REGISTRATION STATEMENT ON FORM S-1/A (filed with the SEC 
on Oct. 29, 2007), Part II, Item 13 at II-1, available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/ 
edgar/data/1105184/000095013407022102/a32360a3sv1za.htm. 
 262. The assumption only projects out five years because, in this author’s past 
experience working with smaller companies, they seldom do meaningful financial 
forecasts beyond five years.  It is unlikely, therefore, that regulatory costs beyond five 
years are substantial motivators of their decisions. 
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wasted $4 million represents 9.6% of SoundBite’s public issuance and 
3.3% of its post-money IPO valuation, and 4.1% of Nanosphere’s public 
issuance and 1.4% of its post-money IPO valuation. 
(b)  Counter Argument – Historical Lack of Price  
Sensitivity by IPO Issuers 
At first glance, it seems logical to conclude that adding $4 million 
of additional expenses over a period of five years to what is already a 
very expensive endeavor could explain the substantial drop in IPO acti-
vity by smaller companies. That $4 million could serve as the proverbial 
“straw that breaks the camel’s back”263, the additional marginal cost that 
renders being a public company too expensive for many smaller IPO-
eligible companies.  Such a conclusion, however, suffers from a signify-
cant problem: companies that conduct IPOs tend not to be price sensitive 
with respect to a few million dollars when making decisions about going 
public. 
There is a substantial amount of empirical support for this lack of 
price sensitivity. The clearest example is the well-documented phenome-
non of issuers “leaving money on the table” in IPOs.264  In a firm-
commitment underwritten IPO (which is the typical method of con-
ducting an IPO), the issuer sells an allotment of its shares to the under-
writers, who then sell those shares to the public.  The price at which the 
 
 263. A more apt analogy might be Mr. Creosote, a fictional character from Monty 
Python’s The Meaning of Life. Mr. Creosote is a morbidly-obese man who dines at a 
French restaurant and proceeds to eat almost all of the food in the restaurant.  At the 
conclusion of his meal, Mr. Creosote states, “I couldn’t eat another thing.  I am abso-
lutely stuffed.”  The maitre d’ convinces Mr. Creosote to eat a “wafer-thin mint” to 
finish off his meal.  The mint was one bite of food too many, and Mr. Creosote 
explodes upon swallowing the mint.  See Wikipedia, Mr. Creosote, http://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Mr._Creosote (last visited Jan. 14, 2009).  Maybe the $4 million are the 
equivalent of the mint? 
 264. See, e.g., Ritter, 2008 IPO Market, supra note 241, at 2; Tim Loughran & Jay 
R. Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time? 33 FIN. MGMT. 5-37 (Fall 
2004) [hereinafter Loughran & Ritter, IPO Underpricing]; Alexander Ljungqvist, IPO 
Underpricing: A Survey, HANDBOOK IN CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE 
FINANCE, B. Espen Eckbo, ed., (forthcoming, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
609422); Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Why Don’t Issuers Get Upset About Leaving 
Money on the Table in IPOs?, 15 REV. OF FIN. STUD., 413-43 (2002) [hereinafter 
Loughran & Ritter, Money on the Table ]; Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO 
Activity, Pricing, and Allocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795-1828 (2002). 
2009 THE CASE AGAINST EXEMPTING 391 
SMALLER REPORTING COMPANIES 
 
underwriters initially sell those shares to the public is the product of a 
negotiation between the issuer’s senior management and the under-
writers, and that price is not set until the night before public trading in 
the shares is to commence.  This pricing decision typically follows a 
multi-week investor “road show”265 and “book building”266 process that 
provide valuable information to the issuer and underwriters about the 
probable demand for the issuer’s shares.  In such a setting, one should 
expect the initial offering price to the public to be fairly representative of 
the public’s initial demand (i.e., the initial offering price should end up 
being very close to the first-day closing price for the shares).  In fact, 
studies have documented that issuers consistently and systematically 
leave money on the table when they agree to the initial offering price 
with the underwriters, as IPO issuances frequently close the first day of 
trading at a significant price increase from the initial offering price 
(referred to as the “first-day IPO pop”), which means that the issuer “left 
money on the table.”267 
“Money left on the table” is defined as “the first-day price gain 
multiplied by the number of shares sold.”268  Professors Loughran and 
Ritter further explain the concept as follows: 
If the shares had been sold at the closing market price rather than the 
[initial] offer price, the proceeds of the offering would have been 
higher by an amount equal to the money left on the table. 
Alternatively, the same proceeds could have been raised by selling 
fewer shares, resulting in less dilution of the preissue shareholders. 
The [first-day] investors’ profits come out of the pocket of the 
issuing company and its preissue shareholders.269 
Historically, issuers have left an enormous amount of money on the 
table when pricing their IPOs.270 
 265. The road show is the company’s marketing trip to investors that takes place 
prior to setting the actual price for the offering. It typically involves a few of the compa-
ny’s executive officers who try to explain to investors why their company will make a 
good investment. 
 266. Book building is the process by which an underwriter attempts to determine at 
what price to offer an IPO based on demand from prospective institutional investors, by 
collecting non-binding commitments from prospective investors. 
 267. Ritter, 2008 IPO Market, supra note 241, at 2; Loughran & Ritter, Money on 
the Table, supra note 264, at 413. 
 268. Loughran & Ritter, Money on the Table, supra note 264, at 413. 
 269. Id. 
 270. The table is derived from Ritter, 2008 IPO Market, supra note 241, at 2. 
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   Aggregate 
Amount Left on 
Table 
Average 






2004 – 2007  651 $125.97 billion $15.40 billion 12.2% 
2001 – 2003 209 $65.91 billion $5.11 billion 7.7% 
1999 – 2000  859 $129.90 billion $66.63 billion 51.3% 
1990 – 1998  3,573 $224.84 billion $29.18 billion 12.9% 
1990 – 2006 5,292 $546.62 billion $116.32 billion 21.3% 
 
 
This money left on the table constitutes a substantial transfer of 
wealth from the issuer and its pre-IPO shareholders to the new IPO 
shareholders.271  Interestingly, issuers seldom complain about money 
left on the table following an IPO.  Research has shown, for example, 
that issuers who left large amounts of money on the table at their IPO do 
not appear to hold that against the IPO underwriters when choosing 
underwriters for a follow-on offering.272  While there is no clear answer 
as to why issuers and their pre-IPO shareholders are willing to leave so 
much money on the table when they price their IPOs,273 the fact remains 
that such parties exhibit, on a not too infrequent basis, a lack of price 
sensitivity when conducting IPOs.  This lack of price sensitivity is so 
substantial that it is plausible to wonder whether a few million dollar 
increase over a five-year period is truly such a significant motivator for 
an issuer contemplating an IPO. 
Another powerful example of issuers’ lack of price sensitivity is the 
general lack of price competition for many of the expenses that are 
involved with conducting an IPO.  Investment banks, for example, are 
notorious for not competing based on price for underwriting business. 
The typical underwriting discount for an IPO is seven percent.274  While 
the underwriting discount may vary somewhat based on the size of the 
deal (e.g., extremely large deals will typically be conducted at a lesser 
 271. See id. at 414. 
 272. Laurie Krigman, Wayne H. Shaw & Kent L. Womack, Why do Firms Switch 
Underwriters? 60 J. FIN. ECON. 245, 256-58 (2001). 
 273. For summaries of some of the more common theories for the IPO underpricing 
phenomenon, see generally Loughran & Ritter, IPO Underpricing, supra note 264, and 
Ljungqvist, supra note 264. 
 274. Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent Solution, 55 J. FIN. 1105, 
1108 (2000). 
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discount), investment banks will almost never vary that percentage in 
order to win business.275  This lack of price competition over the highest 
direct cost involved with an IPO strongly suggests that issuers are not 
price sensitive to a few million dollars.  The same could be said about 
legal fees associated with IPOs, where issuers similarly tend not be very 
price sensitive when choosing outside counsel to assist with the IPO. 
In the face of this lack of price sensitivity evidence, claims that 
Section 404 has rendered IPOs unaffordable lose much of their force. 
(c) Spotlight Hypothesis 
IPOs for smaller companies did, however, drop substantially 
following the introduction of SOX, during a period when the U.S. stock 
markets showed significant growth.  This Article offers an informal 
theory to explain why price-insensitive issuers may have indeed reacted 
to Section 404 when deciding whether to pursue an IPO. 
As discussed above, a company should be expected to conduct an 
IPO when: (1) the issuer’s growth opportunities require external 
funding, (2) external funding can be obtained at a cost that is justified by 
the expected returns from the growth opportunities, and (3) an IPO 
provides the lowest cost of capital of the potential sources of capital.  To 
intelligently make such a calculation, an issuer must undertake a number 
of difficult assessments.  First, the issuer must competently forecast its 
growth opportunities, which is inherently difficult since it involves 
predicting the future.  Thus, when calculating the cost of equity to 
determine whether the growth opportunities justify the cost of capital, 
the issuer should be aware that it is comparing the cost of capital against 
a growth number that is likely to involve a significant degree of 
inaccuracy.  Second, the issuer must calculate the cost of obtaining 
external capital – another inherently imprecise calculation, particularly 
when trying to calculate the cost of equity from an IPO.  Three broad 
categories of factors impact the cost of equity from an IPO: (1) the 
valuation the company achieves; (2) the various costs associated with 
conducting the IPO; and (3) the ongoing maintenance costs associated 
with being a publicly-traded company. 
 
Company valuation: The valuation the company achieves (i.e., the 
price at which the stock is sold to the public) will typically be the big-
 
 275. Orcutt, Investor Skepticism, supra note 55, at 17, n.76. 
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gest factor in the company’s cost of equity.  A myriad of factors impact 
a company’s valuation, only some of which are in the company’s con-
trol, such as the company’s financial performance or the quality of its 
management team.  Others factors are outside the company’s control, 
such as the condition of the public stock markets, the condition of the 
IPO market, and whether the sector in which the issuer operates is in 
demand at the time.  To make the cost of equity calculation particularly 
difficult for the issuer, the decision as to whether or not to conduct an 
IPO will typically be based on a projected valuation range that is calcu-
lated many months before the IPO is actually conducted, which leaves 
the issuer vulnerable to changes in those factors that are outside of its 
control. 
 
Costs associated with conducting the IPO: Numerous costs associ-
ated with conducting an IPO reduce the net proceeds the issuer will actu-
ally receive. Those costs include the underwriting discount, fees paid to 
legal counsel and public auditors, the listing fees for the public stock 
market on which the issuer’s stock will trade, printing and mailing fees, 
transfer agent fees and the expenses involved with conducting the 
investor roadshow. 
 
Ongoing maintenance costs associated with being a publicly-traded 
company:  These costs include the various costs associated with being a 
reporting company, including notably the costs of complying with the 
Exchange Act’s disclosure requirements. 
 
In total, a multitude of factors interacts to establish the eventual 
cost of equity that an issuer achieves in an IPO.  While it might be com-
forting to imagine an issuer’s management working through all of the 
various factors and scenarios and attempting to make a precise mathe-
matical calculation, such an outcome is unlikely.  Even if an issuer’s 
management can recognize each of the potential factors and understand 
its potential impact (and few managers would be capable of doing that), 
the probability of any particular outcome occurring is negligible.276  This 
Article offers an informal theory that, when faced with such a monu-
 276. See generally DAVID DREMAN, CONTRARIAN INVESTMENT STRATEGIES: THE 
NEXT GENERATION 111 (1998).  Dreman’s analysis focused on the securities analysts 
and the fact that they are required to make a single, precise prediction while faced with 
a multitude of factors that can lead to an almost infinite number of outcomes.  Id. 
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price sensitivity. 
 
mental task, an issuer’s management will not try to conduct a detailed 
cost of equity analysis, but instead will allow its decision-making to be 
guided by one or more psychological heuristics.277  For example, an 
issuer’s management may fall prey to the “anchoring”278 or 
“focalism”279 cognitive bias, focusing almost entirely on a few key 
factors rather than trying to weigh all of them.  Based on this author’s 
experience as an investment banker and as IPO counsel, management 
was generally very attentive to the impact of only a few of the cost of 
equity factors when deciding whether or not to pursue an IPO.  In 
particular, management typically focused on the issuer’s forecasted 
profits and the condition of the markets, without fully internalizing most 
of the other factors, including the costs associated with conducting the 
IPO and the ongoing maintenance costs associated with being a public 
company.  Moreover, management did not fully appreciate the impact of 
the IPO underpricing that underwriters might seek at the time of the 
actual IPO.  Because management did not base the decision to pursue an 
IPO on these other factors, these other factors were treated as incidental 
expenses and were managed less aggressively, ultimately resulting in a 
lack of 
 277. “In psychology, heuristics are simple, efficient rules, hard-coded by evolu-
tionary processes or learned, which have been proposed to explain how people make 
decisions, come to judgments, and solve problems, typically when facing complex 
problems or incomplete information.  These rules work well under most circumstances, 
but in certain cases lead to systematic cognitive biases.”  Wikipedia, Heuristic, at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heuristic (last visited Feb. 2, 2009).  “Although much of 
the work of discovering heuristics in human decision-makers has been done by Amos 
Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, the concept was originally introduced by Nobel 
laureate Herbert Simon.”  Id. 
 278. Professors Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman describe anchoring as follows: 
In many situations, people make estimates by starting from an initial value that is 
adjusted to yield the final answer.  The initial value, or starting point, may be 
suggested by the formulation of the problem or it may be the result of a partial 
computation.  In either case, adjustments are typically insufficient.  That is, different 
starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values.  
We call this phenomenon anchoring. 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty:  Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128 (1974). 
 279. “Focalism” refers to the tendency to focus exclusively on a particularly salient 
element without consideration of other potentially relevant information.  HEURISTICS 
AND BIASES:  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 295 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale 
Griffin & Daniel Kahneman, eds., 2002). 
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Section 404 changed the above situation by causing an issuer’s 
management to focus on the costs associated with conducting the IPO 
and the ongoing maintenance costs associated with being a public com-
pany when deciding to conduct an IPO.  All of the attention Section 404 
has received has caused management to become much more cognizant 
of the multitude of expenses that issuers conducting an IPO must face.  
Thus, instead of being perceived as an incremental cost of $4 million 
(per the earlier example), Section 404 may have helped management to 
more fully internalize two entire categories of costs when deciding whe-
ther an IPO offers an appropriate cost of equity.  Rather than funda-
mentally changing the cost of conducting an IPO, Section 404’s greater 
impact – at least temporarily – may have been to change management’s 
psychology in respect of those costs.  Since Section 404 was the source 
of this change in psychology, management ascribes to it a dispropor-
tionate amount of the blame. 
Issuers with an IPO cost of equity that is not justified by the pro-
jected growth returns (or where the spread is only very slight) are now 
more cognizant of the costs and should be more likely to seek an alter-
native source of capital, such as selling the company to a large strategic 
acquirer or getting an investment from a private equity fund.  Inter-
estingly, the availability of these alternative sources of capital has in-
creased substantially during the IPO lull for smaller companies, which 
could indicate that the investment market is properly adjusting to a tight 
IPO market for smaller companies.  It is also worth noting that while a 
vibrant IPO market for smaller companies can provide a number of 
significant benefits (e.g., promoting a vibrant venture capital indus-
try280), over-dependence on IPOs as a financing tool for smaller compa-
nies can pose significant problems to social welfare.  Such problems in-
clude sometimes encouraging an inappropriate risk transfer of higher-
risk investments from investors that are specialized in such higher-risk 
investments (e.g., venture capital funds) to less sophisticated public 
investors, and motivating venture capitalists to engage in certain beha-
viors that have less positive implications for social welfare (e.g., shifting 
their investments from early-stage investment to lower value-added late-
stage investing and over-investment in “hot” industry sectors to the 
exclusion of other industry sectors).281 
 280. See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of 
Capital Markets: Banks versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 274 (1988). 
 281. See PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE 345-47 (2d 
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Viewed in this light, the reduction in IPOs and their replacement by 
alternative sources of financing might be positive.  This author predicts, 
however, that as the uproar over Section 404 quiets, its ability to focus 
management on factors other than the core valuation factors will likely 
wane and will soon have the negligible impact on IPO decision-making 
that one would normally expect from only a few million dollars. 
3. Increase in IPOs on Foreign Stock Markets  
by Smaller U.S. Companies 
One additional potential Section 404 avoidance strategy that has 
received a fair amount of attention is the increase in IPOs on less-
heavily regulated foreign stock markets by smaller U.S. companies.  The 
London Stock Exchange’s Alternative Investment Market (“AIM”) is 
the foreign stock market that appears to have become the most viable 
alternative for smaller U.S. companies.  Touted as the “most successful 
growth market in the world,”282 AIM was launched in 1995 and at year-
end 2007 had 1,634 listed companies with a total market capitalization 
of over £94 billion.283  Beginning in 2000, AIM became an option for 
U.S. companies seeking to conduct an IPO. 284 
 
ed. 2004)); see also Cumming & MacIntosh, supra note 245, at 877-81. 
 282. London Stock Exchange, Company Services – AIM, http://www.londonstock 
exchange.com/en-gb/products/companyservices/ourmarkets/aim_new/AIM (last visited 
Jan. 14, 2009). 
 283. London Stock Exchange, AIM Market Statistics 1 (Dec. 2007), 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/NR/rdonlyres/B6293B90-1125-4591-9E32-C67 
135B3EE4D/0/AIMMarketStatistics0712.pdf (last visited Jan. 114, 2008). 
 284. VC Experts.com, VC Encyclopedia, AIM International Fact Sheet – USA (July 
2007), http://vcexperts.com/files/encyclopedia/2825/us_aim_international_fact_sheet. 
pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2009) [hereinafter AIM International Fact Sheet – USA].  Prior 
to 2000, only one U.S. company conducted an IPO on AIM.  The U.S. company was 
Reflec, a chemical company, that listed on AIM in May 1997.  Id. 
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 No. of U.S. Companies 
that Conducted IPOs on AIM 
Aggregate Market 
Capitalization at Admission 
2006 25 $3,216.4 million 
2005 18 $2,908.7 million 
2004 9 $444.0 million 
2003 3 $161.9 million 
2002 2 $125.5 million 
2001 1 $34.8 million 
2000 1 $18.9 million 
 
One possible interpretation of the AIM phenomenon is that smaller 
U.S. companies are raising equity capital on AIM because it offers them 
a lower cost of equity due to the lower regulatory costs involved with an 
AIM listing (including the fact that regulations governing AIM listings 
do not include a Section 404 type of provision).  For this interpretation 
to be plausible, however, it requires that the smaller U.S. companies 
who conducted their IPOs on AIM were attractive enough to conduct an 
IPO on a U.S. stock market.  Otherwise, the companies are not making a 
choice between AIM and the U.S. stock markets.  For example, compa-
nies wishing to list on the NASDAQ Global Market are effectively re-
quired to have a market capitalization of $50 million.285 To attract mean-
ingful interest from U.S. underwriters and investors, however, the 
threshold is more likely to be a market capitalization of at least $100 
million at admission.  The following table sets forth market capitaliza-
tion figures for the U.S. companies that conducted IPOs on AIM from 
2004 – 2006.286 
 













of $50 million 





of $100 million 
or more at 
admission 
2006 25 $3,216.4 million 18 10 
2005 18 $2,908.7 million 14 10 
2004 9 $444.0 million 2 2 
Total 52 $6,569.1 million 34 22 
 
 
 285. NASD Marketplace Rules 4420(b), 4450(b). 
 286. AIM International Fact Sheet – USA, supra note 284. 
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The result is that less than half of the companies that listed on AIM 
had a realistic ability to conduct an underwritten IPO in the United 
States.  Instead, 22 companies over a three-year period may have made 
the choice to conduct an AIM IPO in order to escape potentially cost-
ineffective U.S. securities regulation.  This is no mass exodus.  In con-
sidering the decision of the 22 companies that initially chose to list on 
AIM rather than a U.S. stock market, it is worth noting that cost savings 
may not have been the only – or even the dominant – factor in their 
decision making.  The private benefits hypothesis287 and the spotlight 
hypothesis288 are also very plausible explanations for their decisions. 
Interestingly, of the 52 U.S. companies that conducted an AIM IPO 
between 2004 and 2006: seven are currently Exchange Act reporting 
companies,289 one has gone on to list on the NASDAQ Global Select 
Market,290 one has gone on to list on the NASDAQ Capital Market,291 
and two have gone on to list on AMEX.292 
C. Net Effect of Section 404 Remains Unclear 
Overall, Section 404’s net effect on smaller companies remains 
unclear. There does not appear to be any question that Section 404 is 
costly and disproportionately more expensive for smaller companies 
than for larger companies.  However, Section 404 is not without signifi-
cant potential benefits, and it is possible that those benefits exceed its 
significant compliance costs. Unfortunately, Section 404’s benefits are 
difficult to calculate with any level of precision, which renders a simple 
cost-benefit analysis for Section 404 nearly impossible to conduct.  
Furthermore, the available anecdotal evidence fairs no better at defini-
 
 287. See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.c(2). 
 288. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2.c. 
 289. Analysis updated through Mar. 1, 2008: The seven companies are: Allied 
Healthcare International Inc., Elcom International, Inc., Energy XXI (Bermuda) 
Limited, Enova Systems, Inc., FutureFuel Corp., Spearhead Limited, Inc., and UTEK 
Corporation. 
 290. Analysis updated through Mar. 1, 2008: Allied Healthcare Int’l Inc., http:// 
www.alliedhealthcare.com (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
 291. Analysis updated through Mar. 1, 2008: Energy XXI (Bermuda) Limited, 
http://www.energyxxi.com (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
 292. Analysis updated through Mar. 1, 2008: UTEK Corporation, http://www.utek 
corp.com (last visited Dec. 27, 2008); Enova Systems, Inc., http://www.enovasystems. 
com (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). 
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tively resolving whether Section 404 is ultimately cost-effective or cost-
ineffective for smaller companies. 
In the face of this uncertainty, what should federal policymakers do 
about Section 404 and its application to smaller public companies? 
PART V: WHAT SHOULD FEDERAL POLICYMAKERS DO IN THE FACE OF 
THIS UNCERTAINTY? 
The SEC has not ignored Section 404’s potential negative impact 
on smaller companies. For example, the SEC has implemented Section 
404 slowly in order to give smaller reporting companies time to ad-
just.293  It has also tried to make management’s and auditors’ evaluations 
of ICFRs more effective and efficient by amending the rules relating to 
management’s evaluation of ICFR, issuing interpretative guidance that 
management can use as a safe harbor in its evaluation of ICFRs, and 
adopting revised auditing standards.294  The question remains, however: 
Should Congress and the SEC do more? 
A. Exempting Smaller Reporting Companies from Section 404 
This Article considers whether Congress and the SEC should 
exempt smaller reporting companies from Section 404 compliance.  
Such exemption could come in several different forms.  Three of the 
more commonly suggested methods for exempting smaller reporting 
companies from Section 404 are as follows: 
 
Complete Exemption: Smaller reporting companies under a certain 
size-threshold could be completely relieved from complying with 
Section 404. 
 
Opt-out Approach: Smaller reporting companies could be subject to 




 293. See supra Part I.C. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Professors Butler and Ribstein have proposed such an opt-out solution for 
Section 404.  BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 10, at 88-90. 
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Eliminate the Auditor Attestation Requirement: Since auditor 
attestation fees make up a substantial portion of Section 404’s compli-
ance costs,296 some have suggested eliminating the external audit of the 
effectiveness of a reporting company’s ICFR as a means to reduce 
Section 404’s compliance costs for smaller reporting companies.297 
B. Exemption Proposals Offer a Market-Based Solution to Determine 
whether Section 404 is Cost-Effective 
The exemption proposals do have some appeal, as they offer a 
market-based resolution to the uncertain value of Section 404.  In each 
case, smaller companies would be relieved (either completely or sub-
stantially) from mandatory compliance with Section 404, but would re-
tain the ability to voluntarily choose to comply with Section 404 if they 
found it to be cost-effective. Market-based solutions can be attractive 
because they help to address the inherent allocation problems that exist 
for the services provided by the U.S. securities regulatory system.  The 
U.S. securities regulatory system provides a variety of services – such as 
rule making, monitoring and supervision – to various stakeholders in the 
securities markets,298 including issuers of securities, broker-dealers, in-
vestors and even the public at large.  While there is some debate as to 
the ultimate goal of securities regulation,299 the more typically cited 
goals of the formal regulatory system include: 
 
 
 296. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 297. See, e.g., Mark G. Heesen, President, Nat’l Venture Capital Ass’n, Comment 
on Proposed ICFR Rules, Standards and Guidance: SEC File No. S7-24-06, PCAOB 
Docket Matter No. 021, at 10-11 (Feb. 23, 2007), available at http://www.nvca.org/pdf 
/NVCA_SEC_PCAOB404.pdf. 
 298. David Llewellyn, The Economic Rationale for Financial Regulation 6 (FSA 
Occasional Papers in Financial Regulation, Apr. 1999), available at http://www.fsa.gov. 
uk/pubs/occpapers/OP01.pdf. 
 299. The most commonly cited rationales for securities regulation are investor pro-
tection and enhancing market efficiency.  See, e.g., Franklin Allen & Richard Herring, 
Banking Regulation versus Securities Market Regulation 2 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., 
Working Paper No. 01-29, 2001).  But see, Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, 
The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711 (2006).  The authors 
assert that protection of the common investor is an antiquated goal of securities 
regulation and that the more appropriate goal of securities regulation is to “create a 
competitive market for sophisticated professional investors and analysts (information 
traders).”  Id. at 711. 
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• to reduce market problems such as information asymmetries or 
agency problems that either (i) expose members of the public to 
inappropriate risk that they are not capable of properly evalu-
ating, or (ii) reduce the efficiency of a securities market; 
• to provide the economies of scale to reduce numerous collective 
action problems that plague widely dispersed investors; 
• to help to reduce the impact of potential “lemons problems” that 
are inherent to securities markets by signaling or establishing 
minimum standards of quality; and/or 
• to allow expert regulators to standardize certain procedures, 
which could lead to lower transaction costs for issuers, investors 
and market professionals.300 
 
Presumably, Section 404 provides a service that addresses in some 
manner many, if not all, of the above goals.  Unlike most goods or ser-
vices, however, the services provided by the formal securities regulatory 
system are not supplied through a market process, which can lead to a 
number of serious allocation problems for the securities regulatory 
services.301  For example, information can be lost about the amount and 
type of regulation that various consumers desire, the price the consumers 
are willing to pay for the regulation, and the changes in the cost of the 
regulation that may occur over time.302  Overall, the lack of market pro-
cess increases the likelihood that a sub-optimal level of regulation will 
be provided – with certain matters being over-regulated while other 
matters are under-regulated.  It is this allocation problem that drives the 
complaints lodged by critics that Section 404’s application to smaller 
companies “goes too far.”  No one argues that improving ICFRs for 
smaller reporting companies is undesirable; instead, critics contest that 
Section 404 involves over-regulation, as “too much” of this service is 
provided to the relevant stakeholders.  Presumably, the critics believe 
 300. For a thoughtful overview of various reasons for financial regulation (including 
reducing market problems, providing economies of scale and addressing lemons 
problems), see Llewellyn, supra note 298, at 21-26. Llewellyn’s analysis had a parti-
cular focus on banking regulation, but is also applicable to securities regulation. With 
regards to lowering transaction costs by standardizing procedures, Regulation S-K 
provides a good example. In theory, Regulation S-K's standardization of disclosure 
should reduce the costs (i) to issuers of furnishing information and (ii) to market 
professionals and investors of analyzing and comparing the information. 
 301. Llewellyn, supra note 298, at 6. 
 302. See id. 
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that smaller company shareholders would not pay for the Section 404 
service if given the choice, because the cost of the service outweighs the 
benefit. 
In a market-based setting, such an allocation problem works itself 
out through consumers expressing their demand for a service either by 
purchasing or not purchasing the service. In the regulatory setting, regu-
lations are less clearly bought and sold, which makes it much more diffi-
cult to identify consumers’ actual demand for the service.  The proposals 
help to address the allocation problem by providing a market-based 
mechanism for smaller reporting companies to decide whether to 
“purchase” (i.e., voluntarily adopt) Section 404.  If managers of smaller 
reporting companies act to maximize shareholder value, one should 
expect them to:  (1) voluntarily choose to comply with Section 404 if it 
proves to be cost-effective, since it would have a net positive impact on 
shareholder value, or (2) avoid Section 404 if it is cost-ineffective, since 
it would have a net negative impact. 
C. A Model for Analyzing the Probable Impact of Exempting Smaller 
Reporting Companies from Section 404 
While empowering smaller reporting companies with such market-
based regulatory solutions seems appealing at first glance, this Article 
posits that structural factors within the public securities markets for 
smaller reporting companies will prevent such market-based proposals 
from achieving such a beneficial allocation outcome.303  Instead, the pro-
posed Section 404 relief proposals are more likely to increase informa-
tion asymmetries for smaller reporting companies, with the risk of these 
greater information asymmetries being borne almost entirely by unso-
phisticated ordinary investors. 
 
 303. This reminds the author of Myron Scholes’ (co-author of the famous Black-
Scholes equation for valuing options) famous quote that “markets look a lot more 
efficient from the banks of the Charles than from the banks of the Hudson.”  John 
Gapper, A Mathematician with a Mission, FT.COM (FINANCIAL TIMES), Sept. 11, 2005, 
available at http://www.columbia.edu/cu/news/clips/2005/09/12/AMathematicianFT. 
pdf. The idea behind the quote is that while academic theories involving efficient 
markets can often appear to provide clean and simple approaches to a given financial 
problem, applying those efficiency theories to actual markets can be much more 
complicated. 
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1.   Foundational Premises 
This Article constructs a model for analyzing the probable impact 
of granting Section 404 relief to smaller reporting companies. In 
constructing the model, this Article relies on three foundational 
premises, each of which will be explained in greater detail below: 
 
• The strength of a company’s ICFR is significant to the overall 
value of that company’s securities; 
• The strength of ICFRs varies widely among smaller reporting 
companies; and 
• The primary external security holders for smaller reporting com-
panies are ordinary investors whose overall level of investment 
sophistication is generally quite low. 
(a) Information About the Strength of a Company’s ICFR  
is Significant to the Value of its Securities 
As discussed earlier, a reporting company’s financial disclosure 
ranks among the most important information for pricing its securities.304  
Since companies with stronger ICFRs should provide more accurate 
financial disclosure than companies with weaker ICFRs, such stronger 
companies should receive more favorable valuations; conversely, the 
weaker companies should receive less favorable valuations.  Assuming 
two companies that are similar in all respects except for the strength of 
their ICFRs, securities of the company with the weaker ICFRs should 
trade at a discount to securities of the stronger company (an “ICFR 
Discount”), as investors should treat the greater risk of inaccurate 
financial disclosure as though it were an additional “cost” in making the 
investment. 
(b)  Strength of ICFRs Varies Widely Among  
Smaller Reporting Companies 
The strength of ICFRs varies widely among smaller reporting com-
panies.  Some smaller reporting companies should be expected to have 
relatively strong ICFRs, while others will have very weak ICFRs.  
Moreover, Orphan SRCs dominate the number of smaller reporting com-
 
 304. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
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panies, and these Orphan SRCs pose a substantial risk for weak ICFRs.  
Orphan SRCs have little to no meaningful institutional and secondary 
support, which means these companies have few effective external 
mechanisms for monitoring their performance, including the strength of 
their ICFRs.305 
(c)  Predominance and Vulnerability of Ordinary Investors 
For a market-based approach to investor-protection regulations to 
work properly, the investors who are empowered with the choice of 
whether or not to encourage their companies to “purchase” the regula-
tion must have the rationality and capacity to:  (1) recognize that they 
have such a choice, (2) evaluate that choice intelligently, and (3) price 
the impact of that choice into the price of the security.  Investors, 
however, are not a homogenous group.  Different investors have differ-
ent levels of sophistication, including the ability to account for and 
evaluate the various factors that go into the price of a given security.  
For illustrative purposes, this Article will oversimplify the matter and 
group investors into two broad categories: institutional investors and 
ordinary investors.  Institutional investors, such as mutual funds, insur-
ance companies, pension funds, investment banks, or other entities who 
regularly invest large amounts of money in the securities markets, are 
generally sophisticated investors; they have both the rationality and 
capacity to intelligently investigate and value securities investments.  
More specifically, institutional investors have the capacity to: (1) 
identify and obtain the information they need in order to intelligently 
evaluate the worth of a given security, (2) evaluate that information, (3) 
recognize when they receive questionable information or lack sufficient 
information, and appropriately account for such questionable or missing 
information (e.g., by discounting the price they will pay for the securi-
ties investment), and (4) understand and internalize the risks involved 
with investing in securities. 
Ordinary investors are basically everyone other than institutional 
investors.  Smaller reporting companies in general, and Orphan SRCs in 
particular, tend to have much less institutional shareholder ownership 
than large reporting companies.  For smaller reporting companies, ordi-
nary investors are likely to play a much more significant role.  This 
heavy ordinary shareholder ownership is problematic for market-based 
 
 305. See supra Part II.B. 
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regulatory approaches because ordinary investors have historically 
demonstrated an inability to intelligently investigate and value securities 
investments.  In fact, the federal mandatory disclosure system was de-
signed primarily to protect ordinary investors,306 not only because they 
suffer from the typical informational disadvantage that all investors 
face,307 but also because ordinary investors are generally so unsophisti-
cated that they do not recognize the magnitude of their informational 
disadvantage, and therefore do not sufficiently discount the value of 
securities offered them to compensate for this informational disad-
vantage.308 
2. Exemption Proposals would Increase Informational Asymmetries for 
Smaller Reporting Companies at the Expense of Ordinary Investors 
If this Article’s foundational premises in Part V.C.1 are correct, 
granting smaller reporting companies relief from Section 404 should 
increase informational asymmetries between those companies and their 
ordinary investors.  Moreover, the informational asymmetries will im-
 306. See, e.g., Proposed Rules: Resale of Restricted Securities; Changes to Method 
of Determining Holding Period of Restricted Securities under Rules 144 and 145, 
Release No. 33-6806 (Oct. 25, 1988) at *10-11. 
 307. See Paul G. Mahoney, Technology, Property Rights in Information, and 
Securities Regulation, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 815, 842 (1997). 
 308. See id. at 842.  In 2003, the NASD conducted an investor survey that strongly 
suggests that ordinary investors’ general lack of sophistication persists today.  NASD 
Investor Literacy Research (Executive Summary), Prepared by Applied Research & 
Consulting LLC (2003), http://www.nasdr.com/pdf-text/surveyeyecsum.pdf; see also 
NASD News Release, NASD Announces $10-Million Education Fund – Investor 
Survey Underscores Importance of Education (Dec. 2, 2003), available at http:// www. 
nasdr.com/news/pr2003/release_03_054.html [hereinafter NASD News Release].  In 
the survey, the NASD “asked 1,086 [ordinary] investors more than 50 basic . . . 
questions about investing in stocks, bonds and mutual funds.” NASD News Release. 
Some of the more shocking findings of the survey include: 
• Nearly 50 percent [of respondents] thought stock market losses were insured. 
• Seventy percent of investors failed to understand that when you buy on margin, 
you can lose all of your investment even if the value of your shares does not go 
to zero. 
• Nearly 80 percent did not understand fully the meaning of “no load” mutual 
funds. 
Id. 
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pose significant costs on those ordinary investors as they are unlikely to 
appreciate the magnitude of the asymmetries.309 
To illustrate why one should expect an increase in informational 
asymmetries, let us assume for simplicity’s sake that there are two kinds 
of smaller reporting companies:310  those with weak ICFRs (and the least 
accurate financial disclosure) and those with strong ICFRs (and the most 
accurate financial disclosure).  The market response to this different 
quality of ICFRs should be one of pricing.311  Assuming that the market 
price for smaller reporting companies is established primarily by sophis-
ticated investors, such sophisticated investors could simply demand a 
higher forecasted return (i.e., they would pay a lower price for the 
securities) when investing in a smaller reporting company with weak 
ICFRs to compensate for the increased risk of inaccurate financial dis-
closure.312 Unfortunately, it is inherently difficult to accurately identify 
the strength of a given smaller reporting company’s ICFR; the infor-
mation needed to make that determination is possessed by the compa-
ny’s managers and is difficult to communicate to investors in a verifi-
able manner absent some type of certification process.  Where sophisti-
cated investors are incapable of distinguishing which smaller reporting 
companies have weak or strong ICFRs, one should expect the sophisti-
cated investors to discount the securities prices for all smaller reporting 
companies313 by some amount to approximate the overall risk of that 
category of investment.  The investors’ inability to identify which 
smaller reporting companies are riskier (and which are less risky) gives 
rise to a classic lemons problem,314 as investors will likely establish a 
discount rate that is overly harsh for companies with strong ICFRs (i.e., 
they will over-discount these companies and under-pay for their 
securities). Conversely, investors will likely establish an overly generous 
discount rate for companies with weak ICFRs (i.e., they will under-
discount these companies and over-pay for their securities). The result is 
 309. See generally David T. Llewellyn, Regulation of Retail Investment Services, 15 
ECON. AFFAIRS 12 (1995) (in examining the banking market, Llewellyn explains why a 
regulation-free environment imposes costs on retail consumer who are unsophisticated 
about the financial products sold by banks). 
 310. This model is based on Dr. Akerlof’s model for used cars in Akerlof, supra 
note 240, at 489-92. 
 311. See Choi & Fisch, supra note 44, at 272. 
 312. See id. 
 313. See id. 
 314. See id. 
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that a less than optimal amount of investment capital flows to smaller 
reporting companies that are stronger, while too much capital flows to 
those that are weaker. 
Stronger companies are penalized by this effect, which should 
motivate them to clearly differentiate themselves from weaker compa-
nies.  For example, if the market for smaller reporting companies was 
dominated by sophisticated investors, a company with stronger ICFRs 
could signal that strength by voluntarily adopting Section 404, thereby 
causing the sophisticated investors to reduce the ICFR Discount they 
apply to that company.  Where the excess discount charged to a smaller 
reporting company with stronger ICFRs exceeds the cost of Section 404 
compliance, one should expect that company to voluntarily adopt 
Section 404.  Presumably, the Section 404 compliance costs for those 
smaller reporting companies with stronger ICFRs would be lower than 
for weaker companies, so the stronger companies would be highly moti-
vated to adopt Section 404 and distinguish themselves.  This would help 
investors to both better identify those companies with stronger ICFRs 
and those with weaker ICFRs, thus further increasing the ICFR Discount 
charged to those companies. 
The above analysis is based on the assumption that the market for 
smaller reporting companies is dominated by sophisticated investors 
who understand the impact of ICFRs and Section 404, and who can both 
intelligently evaluate the situation and ascribe a value to the smaller 
reporting company’s decision to voluntarily comply with, or not comply 
with, Section 404.  In fact, however, the market for smaller reporting 
companies is dominated by unsophisticated ordinary investors, which 
significantly alters the analysis.  Unlike sophisticated investors, ordinary 
investors should be expected to suffer from a number of problems that 
reduce their ability to serve as an optimal market feedback mechanism: 
 
• There is a significant risk that ordinary investors will not 
recognize they are making a choice about the value of ICFRs 
and Section 404 when making an investment decision regarding 
a smaller reporting company; 
• Even if ordinary investors recognize they are making a choice 
about the value of ICFRs and Section 404, there is a significant 
risk that they do not adequately understand the function of 
ICFRs or how Section 404 helps to address that issue.  In short, 
their decisions on the matter are likely to be uninformed; and/or 
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• As noted above, ordinary investors have historically shown an 
inability to sufficiently discount the value of securities when 
faced with exactly the type of information asymmetry that exists 
regarding the strength of a smaller reporting company’s ICFR. 
 
Moreover, the probability that ordinary investors would largely 
miss the point about the importance of ICFRs would be increased by any 
relief proposal, as such relief proposal could easily be interpreted by 
ordinary investors as a signal that policymakers do not consider ICFRs 
all that important for smaller reporting companies.  In sum, this Article 
predicts that ordinary investors would apply an ICFR discount that is 
substantially too low. 
Such a scenario should deter smaller reporting companies with 
strong ICFRs from pursuing strategies that clearly signal the strength of 
their ICFRs (such as voluntarily adopting Section 404), because the 
inappropriately low ICFR discount applied by ordinary investors reduces 
the benefit for strong ICFR companies to pursue such signaling 
strategies.  Unless the cost of the signaling strategy is very low, it be-
comes cost-ineffective for strong ICFR companies to pursue such strate-
gies.  Therefore, while clear signaling efforts would help to increase the 
overall efficiency of the market for smaller reporting company 
securities, such signaling is unlikely to occur.  The greatest beneficiary 
of this lack of clear signaling by strong ICFR companies is the weak 
ICFR companies.  Without a clear mechanism for highlighting those 
companies with weaker ICFRs, weak ICFR companies can sell their se-
curities at prices that are inappropriately advantageous for the weaker 
companies and inappropriately disadvantageous for the ordinary in-
vestors. 
In short, making Section 404 voluntary for smaller reporting 
companies would not provide significant value to smaller reporting com-
panies with strong ICFRs.  In fact, it could prove detrimental to these 
companies, as the securities market for smaller reporting companies 
should be expected to encourage companies with weaker ICFRs (since 
they would receive an inappropriately advantageous cost of capital), 
which could eventually result in a lemons problem for this market.  
Indeed, it could be that such a lemons problem helps to explain why 
currently, institutional investors are less likely to invest in smaller 
reporting companies than are ordinary investors.  Instead, the greatest 
benefit from such relief would flow instead to smaller reporting compa-
nies with weak ICFRs.  Finally, the cost of assisting those smaller 
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reporting companies with weak ICFRs would be borne unknowingly, 
and primarily, by ordinary investors who would be paying too much for 
the securities of these companies. 
D. Mandatory Section 404 Compliance for Smaller Reporting 
Companies Reduces Informational Asymmetries 
Mandatory Section 404 compliance for smaller reporting companies 
helps to resolve such problems by reducing informational asymmetries 
about the strength of their ICFRs.  In general, where a securities market 
is dominated by unsophisticated ordinary investors, greater information-
al asymmetries and agency problems will arise because ordinary inves-
tors (1) will find it difficult to determine the quality of the information 
provided and (2) are less capable of effectively monitoring manage-
ment.315  Where that very same market also lacks meaningful institu-
tional and secondary support, the problem is exacerbated due to a lack of 
collective investment in information gathering and monitoring services.  
In such a scenario, explicit, mandatory federal securities regulation can 
help to reduce these problems by having the federal government replace 
unsophisticated investors as the primary determinant of what level of 
reporting and monitoring services should be provided.  Regarding 
Section 404 specifically, unsophisticated, ordinary investors are not 
well-equipped to intelligently investigate and evaluate the strength of a 
company’s ICFR and there is little institutional or secondary support to 
otherwise help deal with the problem.  Therefore, requiring compliance 
with Section 404 addresses the expected informational asymmetry by 
establishing a minimum standard for ICFRs. 
It must be pointed out, however, that mandatory regulatory solu-
tions are never problem free.  As noted earlier, the fact that mandatory 
regulation is not subject to a market process increases the likelihood that 
a sub-optimal level of regulation will be provided; certain matters 
become over-regulated while others remain under-regulated.  Even 
though the SEC is a highly-specialized regulatory body that should be 
much more sophisticated than most ordinary investors, there remains the 
risk that the SEC will not establish the optimal minimal standards for 
ICFR disclosure and monitoring.316  While such a regulatory allocation 
 
 315. See generally Llewellyn, supra note 309 (making a similar argument for retail 
bank customers). 
 316. See GEORGE J. BENTSON, REGULATING FINANCIAL MARKETS – A CRITIQUE AND 
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problem is in no way insignificant, this Article suggests that experi-
mentation with market-based proposals to overcome that problem be 
conducted first in markets where ordinary investors are less vulnerable.  
Thus, ironically, it is larger reporting companies who have the stronger 
case for exemption from Section 404, as their public securities markets 
are dominated by securities intermediaries and sophisticated institutional 
investors who can serve as an accurate market feedback mechanism for 
the value of Section 404 (with ordinary investors free riding on the 
expertise and efforts of these more sophisticated parties). 
Regulations that have a significant consumer protection aspect also 
can give rise to a potential “moral hazard” problem.317  The recipients of 
the consumer protection (in this case ordinary investors) may be led to 
believe that the regulated parties (in this case smaller reporting compa-
nies) have been made safe and that less care need be taken when dealing 
with the regulated parties.318  There is no easy answer to this moral haz-
ard problem.  Federal policymakers must take care to properly manage 
the expectations of recipients of consumer protection initiatives.  Regu-
latory initiatives should never eliminate an investor’s incentive to exer-
cise due care,319 and that message should be clearly and regularly com-
municated to investors. 
E. Manner of Exemption Could Impact Analysis 
The analysis in Part V.C.2 assumes that smaller reporting compa-
nies are granted a complete exemption from Section 404.  Such analysis 
could be materially impacted if federal policymakers decide to provide 
smaller reporting companies a less complete exemption to Section 404.  
Consider, for example, if federal policymakers pursue an “opt-out” ap-
proach, or eliminate the auditor attestation requirement for smaller re-
porting companies. 
An opt-out approach to Section 404 could avoid some of the infor-
mation asymmetry problems that would likely arise from a complete 
exemption approach.  The benefit of an opt-out approach is that it could 
be structured so as to require companies wishing to opt out of Section 
 
SOME PROPOSALS 48 (1999) (making a similar criticism of government agencies’ ability 
to establish disclosure standards for banking customers). 
 317. See Llewellyn, supra note 298, at 51. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
412 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE &  Vol. XIV 
 FINANCIAL LAW 
 
404 to undergo a formal shareholder approval process.  For example, 
assume that the opt-out is conditioned upon the smaller reporting 
company amending its certificate of incorporation to eliminate the cor-
poration’s responsibility for complying with Section 404.  As a matter of 
state corporate law, such an amendment would require that the compa-
ny’s board adopt the proposed amendment and submit it to the share-
holders for approval.320  The board would also be required to make a 
recommendation to the shareholders to adopt the amendment.321  The 
opt-out approach would not cure the predominance and vulnerability of 
ordinary shareholders, but it would at least provide a very clear signal to 
the existing ordinary shareholders of the ICFR issue and would require 
the directors to make proxy disclosure on the advisability of the opt-out 
that would subject them to potential anti-fraud liability under Exchange 
Act Rule 14a-9322 if their disclosure contained a false or misleading 
statement.  Therefore, it is at least possible that the opt-out approach 
would: (1) make the exemption process so public that ordinary investors 
would be spurred to provide a more appropriate ICFR discount to com-
panies that seek to avoid Section 404; or (2) that the burdens of the opt-
out process would be sufficient to motivate a significant number of com-
panies to comply with Section 404, allowing Section 404 compliance to 
serve as a clear signal of the strength of a company’s ICFR. 
If the Section 404 exemption proposal is limited to exempting 
smaller reporting companies from the auditor attestation requirement, it 
is theoretically possible that such exemption strategy could have a less 
drastic outcome than is predicted in Part V.C.2.  It could be that the 
Section 404(a) management report on ICFR alone will dramatically im-
prove ICFRs at smaller reporting companies such that the ICFR discount 
is sufficiently lowered without the need for the costly auditor attes-
tations.  While possible, this author is highly skeptical of such an out-
come.  As noted above, since the securities markets for smaller reporting 
companies are dominated by unsophisticated ordinary investors and lack 
meaningful institutional or secondary support, these companies receive 
less monitoring services which makes them ripe for just the type of 
agency problems that necessitate external audits generally.  Even for 
 320. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242; MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 
10.03. 
 321. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242; MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 
10.03. 
 322. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9. 
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larger companies, which do have substantial external monitoring ser-
vices, external audits appear to have been necessary to push manage-
ment to find and disclose material weaknesses in their ICFRs.323 
It is “possible,” then, that a less than complete exemption “could” 
avoid some of the information asymmetry problems predicted in Part 
V.C.2.  Because the risk of under-regulation would be borne primarily, 
and unknowingly, by unsophisticated ordinary investors, the burden for 
establishing that the more tailored exemption is socially beneficial 
should be placed on the party proposing the exemption.  Therefore, 
rather than continue to delay full implementation of Section 404 for all 
reporting companies until it is proven that Section 404 is cost-effective, 
which roughly describes the current treatment of Section 404 for non-
accelerated filers, this Article concludes that the threat to ordinary 
investors is so substantial that the burden should be switched to those 
seeking delays or modifications to Section 404’s implementation. 
PART VI: CONCLUSION 
This Article recommends that smaller reporting companies not be 
exempted from Section 404.  While a market-based solution to the 
Section 404 cost-benefit debate is intuitively appealing, this Article 
demonstrates why exempting smaller reporting companies from Section 
404 and allowing market forces to resolve the need for ICFR services is 
an inherently unworkable solution.  Because the market for smaller 
reporting companies is dominated by Orphan SRCs and unsophisticated 
ordinary investors, exempting smaller reporting companies from Section 
404 is likely to increase information asymmetries between smaller re-
porting companies and their ordinary investor shareholders (who have 
historically demonstrated themselves to be particularly vulnerable to this 
type of information asymmetry).  Rather than improve the allocation of 
ICFR services, exempting smaller reporting companies from Section 
404 would almost certainly guarantee an insufficient level of ICFR 
 323. See Letter from Lynn E. Turner, Managing Dir., Glass, Lewis & Co., LLC, to 
Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, SEC 5-6 (Apr. 12, 2005), available at http://www.sec. 
gov/news/press/4-497/leturner041205.pdf.  Turner notes that “a record number of errors 
in financial statements . . . in the fourth quarter of 2004. . . .  While the increased 
transparency and improvement in internal controls is a positive development, we must 
highlight that many of the Chief Executive Officers and Chief Financial Officers of 
these same companies had previously certified to their investors that their internal 
controls were operating effectively.”  Id. 
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services for smaller reporting companies, with the cost for that insuffi-
cient dedication of resources being borne primarily and unknowingly by 
unsophisticated ordinary investors. 
While mandatory Section 404 regulation helps to address the prob-
lem of smaller reporting companies under-investing resources in their 
ICFRs, it must be remembered that the mandatory regulation approach 
suffers from its own problems.  In the case of Section 404, the uncertain 
net effect of Section 404 still needs to be addressed.  Tailoring Section 
404 to meet the particular needs of smaller reporting companies and 
their security holders will need to be conducted by the SEC and the 
PCAOB, rather than naturally occur through a market-based process.  
Moreover, the risk of ordinary investors falling prey to a moral hazard 
problem must continue to be monitored.  If the choice, however, is bet-
ween an increased risk of marginal over-regulation (and/or marginally 
misplaced regulation) versus smaller reporting companies almost 
certainly under-investing resources in their ICFRs and exposing ordinary 
investors to significantly increased investment risk without their reali-
zing it, the preference should be for mandatory regulation and its 
shortcomings. 
 
